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SUMMARY
Suspension bridge wire is inherently susceptible to corrosion
damage. The main cables of suspension bridges, which are composed of
many of these wires, are usually fracture-critical (non-redundant)
structural members.
Therefore, consequences of corrosion of wires of
suspension-bridge cables can be very severe.
At least seven different corrosive mechanisms may be involved in
bridge-wire corrosion and cracking problems: uniform corrosion, pitting
corrosion, crevice corrosion, fretting, stress corrosion, hydrogen
cracking, and corrosion fatigue. Of these, stress corrosion, hydrogen
cracking, and corrosion fatigue are cracking processes. The other forms
of corrosion may be contributory or prerequisites for the cracking
process.
Suspension bridge wire corrosion and cracking problems have not been
infrequent since 1900. In the US, three wire-cable suspension bridges
collapsed during that period, with some loss of life. Worldwide, at
least 13 cable suspension bridges have experienced corrosion or cracking
damage sufficient
to warrant major repairs
or complete cable
replacement.
Laboratory tests of bridge wire were first performed in 1935 on
specimens of heat-treated wire from the Mt. Hope and Ambassador bridges.
In those tests, the Bureau of Standards attempted to replicate service
fractures. In 1940, Pollard (Bureau of Standards) performed laboratory
tests to induce stress corrosion fractures in wire specimens from the
first cables of the Portsmouth Bridge. In 1978, Battelle Laboratories
of Columbus, Ohio, performed failure analyses on wires from the second
cables of the Portsmouth Bridge. Further chemical and mechanical tests
were performed on that wire by the Federal Highway Administration in
1978. In the early 1970's, Boeing Commercial Airplane Company performed
a series of stress corrosion tests on bridge wire for the Federal
Highway Administration.
A report on the Portsmouth Bridge second
corrosion problem was published by the Ohio Department of Transportation
in 1980. The National Physical Laboratory of Great Britain has recently
reported on its work related to cracking problems in prestressing wires.
The Kentucky Transportation Research Program has conducted several
corrosion inspections of bridge wires since 1974, when a wire rope
(suspender), removed from the Ohio Bridge at Covington, was sectioned
and examined. Cables on the Portsmouth, Covington (Ohio Bridge), and
Maysville suspension bridges have been inspected. The Portsmouth Bridge
was inspected during the period it was closed for cable replacement
(1978-80). The corrosion problem that led to that work was caused by
failure of the corrosion protection system (paint and wire wrapping) and
the subsequent entrainment of large amounts of water.
Deterioration of galvanized helical strand was observed to occur in
four stages. In Stage 1, the strand wire were shiny with random signs
of zinc corrosion.
During Stage 2, the zinc would be partially
corroded, revealing a white corrosion product, but no ferrous rust would
be present.
In Stage 3, the zinc would be depleted, with occasional
spots of ferrous rust. During Stage 4, the zinc corrosion product would
be largely displaced ·by ferrous rust.
Cracking was possible during
Stage 3 and could be expected during Stage 4.
Inspection of the Maysville Bridge revealed that the corrosion
protection system (paint and wire wrapping) was gradually deteriorating.

Some water and signs of moisture damage were detected on cable wrapping
and at cable bands. The condition of the wires was assessed by placing
several inspection ports on the cables and by examining the cable
strands. The condition of the exposed wire varied from Stage 2 to early
Stage 3 deterioration. The strands in the anchorages were satisfactory.
No broken wires were detected.
Inspection of the Ohio Bridge at Covington disclosed several
potential problem areas.
The original cable strands were subject to
water damage from roof leakage inside the anchor chambers. Also, some
signs of minor corrosion damage were evident on secondary cable strands
in the Ohio anchorages.
The worst potential problem appeared to be
posed by thick deposits of pigeon droppings on the cables and stays at
the tower peaks.
Several wire breaks were detected during the
inspections (though most of those predated present concerns).
Two small unstiffened suspension bridges in eastern Kentucky also
were inspected.
The exposed wire strands on those bridges showed no
signs of corrosion damage.
Work on suspension bridges in Kentucky yields a somewhat differing
view of cable corrosion and cracking problems than would be surmised
from existing literature.
In part, this seems to be due to a general
preoccupation with stress corrosion in past research efforts. Most work
is well done, but does not relate suitably to the physical situations
observed at the Portsmouth Bridge with regard to the second cable
corrosion problem.
.,
The salient features of the Portmsouth Bridge second cable corrosion
problem were 1) the presence of uniform corrosion at all fracture sites,
2) the lack of specific stress corrosion-related corrodants other than
sulfur and hydrogen, 3) the lack of unusual or damaging concentrations
of corrodants in the Portsmouth area, 4) the differing fracture
morphologies on the Portsmouth Bridge cables, and 5) the cyclic loading
of the Portsmouth Bridge cables.
Many fractures on the second Portsmouth Bridge wire were more
typical of corrosion fatigue cracking than stress corrosion cracking.
Also, Boeing researchers were unable to produce sulfur-induced stress
corrosion cracks in bridge wire.
Combined with previously enumerated
evidence, those facts indicated corrosion fatigue probably was the most
important fracture mechanism affecting the Portmouth Bridge wires.
The importance of corrosion fatigue, compared to other forms of
corrosion cracking, is that high concentrations of corrodants are not
required. The only requirement is . for bridge wire to be in long-term
contact with moisture (and possibly a nominal amount of common
atmospheric pollutants).
It is recommended that inspection ports be installed on the Ohio
Bridge (KY 17) at Covington and to continue corrosion monitoring on the
Maysville Bridge (US 68).
Research related to bridge wire corrosion
problems and their prevention should be encouraged.
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INTRODUCTION
This is the second of three reports concerning suspension bridges
and corrosion. The first report (1) contained background information on
suspension bridges that may be useful to persons not well acquainted
with those structures.
The final (2) report contains suggestions for
assessing the condition of suspension bridge wires and for providing
necessary remedial actions.
This work was initiated in 1978 after the closure of the General U.
S. Grant Bridge (termed the Portsmouth Bridge) (US 23) over the Ohio
River between Portsmouth, Ohio, and South Shore, Kentucky.
Of major
concern to the Kentucky Department of Highways is the structural
condition of the two large suspension bridges owned by Kentucky, the
Ohio Bridge at Covington, Kentucky (1,010-foot main span), and the
Maysville Bridge at Maysville, Kentucky (1,060-foot main span).
The basis for this report was a series of inspections conducted on
the Portsmouth Bridge during the cable replacement operation (1978-79).
Thereafter; a series of inspections was performed on the Ohio and
Maysville bridges. Some brief laboratory examinations were performed on
wire specimens taken from the Portsmouth Bridge.
Also, an extensive
review of relevant, available literature was conducted.
Perhaps the most ·interesting, and at times, the most puzzling fact
addressed during this study is that the Maysville Bridge has remained in
service since 1930 without showing major signs of cable deterioration,
However, just 50 miles upstream on the same Ohio River, the Portsmouth
Bridge cables have succumbed to corrosion twice since its erection in
1927. An investigation, which lead to this report, was deemed neces.sary
to determine the contributory and mechanistic factors involved in
suspension bridge corrosion problems and to establish the applicability
of those factors to the Kentucky-owned suspension bridges.

CORROSION OF BRIDGE WIRE
Suspension bridge wires expose 10 to 20 times the surface area of
normal structural steel (based on a ratio of surface area to crosssectional area).
Therefore, wire damage by corrosion may result in a
much greater loss of strength than equivalent corrosion damage to common
structural members. Another fact to consider is that most suspensionbridge main cables are fracture-critical members. The trusses of most
suspension bridges will not support their own weight.
If a main cable
of a suspension bridge should fail, the entire structure might collapse
in a catastrophic manner, with the possible exception of the towers
(unless rocker towers were employed).
Therefore, consequences of
corrosion damage to suspension bridge cables are more severe than
corrosion damage to most structural members of other bridge types.
Many corrosion problems are unique and must be examined on an
individual basis due to the complex electrical-chemical-mechanical
interaction that takes place between the metal, corrodant(s), and
environment (3-5).
The following discussion is a brief outline of
corrosion, specifically the types of corrosion that may be experienced
by suspension bridge wires. Corrosive mechanisms described are believed
to be relevant, based on field and laboratory observations in Kentucky.
The applicability of some of these mechanisms, based on field and
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laboratory investigations, will be detailed, in another section of this
report.
At least seven types of corrosive attack may be involved in bridge
wire corrosion:
uniform corrosion,
pitting
corrosion,
crevice
corrosion, fretting, stress corrosion, hydrogen cracking, and corrosion
fatigue.
While only two or three of those mechanisms may cause wire
cracking, the other types may be contributory. Indeed, some of those
other mechanisms are probably necessary prerequisites to corrosive
attack mechanisms that cause wire fracture.
Uniform corrosion of iron,or steel usually involves an interaction
between iron, hydrogen, and oxygen. This usually produces three layers
of iron oxides. The inner layer consists of white to greenish-black
ferrous oxide (FeO * nH 20) on ferrous hydroxide (Fe(OH) 2 ), which acts as
a diffusion barrier bel:ween the atmosphere and the iron surface.
A
hydrous ferrous ferrite (Fe o * nH 0) forms a black intermediate layer.
2
3 4
The outer layer consists of hydrous ferrous oxide (Fe o ), which is
2 3
orange to brown in color and is common rust.
Con tact with aqueous solutions is required to maintain aggressive
uniform corrosion of iron. The resulting corrosion product is a thick,
scaly layer of ferrous oxide (rust). When iron is not in contact with
an aqueous solution, it will form an intermediate, stable ferrous oxide.
Of times this oxide will be passive (corrosion inhibiting). In aqueous
solutions that are nearly neutral, the corrosion rate of iron is
dependent upon the amount of oxygen dissolved in the solution. This
diffusion-controlled
uniform
corrosion
of
iron
increases
with
temperature. The corrosion rate may be doubled for every 55°F rise in
temperature. When hydrogen is evolved, the corrosion rate may be more
than double.
Above a pH of 10, the corrosion rate decreases, as the iron surface
becomes passive.
In the pH range between 4-10, the corrosion rate is
independent of pH and is controlled by diffusion of oxygen to the metal
surface.
Below a pH of 4, the ferrous-oxide film dissolves and the
corrosion rate depends upon the reaction rates of hydrogen and oxygen at
the metal surface (6).
In the pH range of 4-10, oxygen concentration, temperature, and
disposition in an aqueous medium determine the corrosion rate. Coldworked steel corrodes at the same rate as annealed steel in water. The
corrosion rate of, wrought iron or steel in that pH range is similar. In
the pH range of 0-4, the percentage of metal impurities such as carbon,
nitrogen, sulfur and phosphorus can have a marked effect on the
corrosion rate.
In acids, the corrosion rate of cold-worked steel is
several times greater than annealed steel (7, 8). The disposition of
cementite, the carbon-rich second phase of steel, has a strong influence
on the uniform corrosion rate in an acid environment.
The atmosphere is a major factor in many corrosion problems. It can
provide moisture, a susceptible thermal environment, and aggresive
corrodants.
Moisture is required for the electrolytic corrosion of
metals. When a metal is exposed to the atmosphere, the time-of-wetness
is not only dependent on periods of rainfall, but also the daily
evaporation-condensation cycle.
This is a complex interaction of
temperature, air movement, and relative humidity.
Large thermal
gradients, such as loss of heat from the suspension bridge cables in the
evening, will promote condensation of moisture on strands.
More
condensation may be expected on the exterior strands as the thermal
4

gradients are higher at the outer portions of the cable. Since more
moisture will be present on the exterior strands, uniform corrosion
there will be worse (9-11).
Common atmospheric pollutants include so 2 , H s, NH , N0 and various
2
3
2
salts (12). These act as corrodants when in contact with steel in an
aqueous environment. Airborne solid particulates (dust) deposited on
the metal surface may promote corrosion by acting as sites for the
condensation of water vapor.
When a corrosion product such as rust
forms on the metal surface, it will absorb atmospheric moisture
hydroscopically under conditions where moisture will not be deposited on
a clean metal surface.
In situations where atmospheric moisture is retained, the ferrous
surface may corrode more rapidly than when frequently washed (contacted
by flowing water). This is usually due to the formation of H so from
2 3
so3; however, under other circumstances, washing or periodic wetting
greatly increases the corrosion rate (13).
A large amount of vehicle-related pollution is generated around
bridges. Therefore, bridges in rural locations may be subject to higher
concentrations of corrodants than the typical surrounding environment.
Also, solid particulates such as sulfides generated by smokestacks may
be carried airborne for very long distances. For instance, Lexington,
Kentucky, has no substantial so output. Yet, at one time, the daily
2
particulate sulfate concentration was relatively high (10-40 micrograms
per cubic meter). Research revealed the pollution level was caused by
smokestack output from power plants up to 226 miles away (14).
The corrosion of galvanizing (zinc coating) is usually linear with
time in a given atmosphere.
When zinc reacts with moisture, zinc
hydroxide is formed and hydrogen is released. The zinc hydroxide reacts
with co to form insoluble zinc carbonate. When the contacting moisture
2
is acid1.c,
the zinc will dissolve rapidly. As the reaction proceeds,
resulting products will form a basic salt, usually a carbonate, which
precipitates. This coating acts as a temporary inhibitor. Researchers
suspect atmospheric pollutants, especially so , form acids that attack
2
the protective zinc oxide and carbonate films. Those films are soluble
in acids (such as H so ) and eventually will be dissolved and
2 4
redistributed over the metal surface with successive wetting cycles.
The redeposited oxide is porous and does not act as a good diffusion
barrier. Therefore, underlying steel will eventually rust (15, 16).
Pitting is a localized form of corrosive attack. The result of this
form of corrosion is formation of small deep pits on the surface of the
metal. Pitting occurs when small areas become anodic to the bulk of the
surface, or when highly localized changes in the corrodant in contact
with the metal accelerate the local attack.
The corrosive rate of
attack at pits may be 10 to 100 times as great as the uniform corrosion
rate (17, 18). Pitting in galvanizing is usually associated with mild
atmospheres (19). A localized failure of a protective oxide film may
lead to pitting. When the galvanizing on wires is depleted, the zinc
corrosion product may still be protective. However, if that film is
chipped (possibly due to expansion of some underlying rust), the exposed
ferrous surface may be subject to pitting. The most important effect of
pitting is its effect on local chemistry in the pits, not its effect on
stress intensity.
Crevice corrosion occurs due to differential aeration (differences
in the concentration of oxygen in an aqueous corrodant, for example).
5

Another cause may be concentration of soluble contaminents, such as
sulfur, in water. The aqueous corrodant penetrates crevices like those
between wires in a strand (Figure 1). Initially, anodic dissolution (M
+
- = 40H- )
= M + e ) of the metal and cathodic reduction (0 + 2H o + 4e
2
2
occur uniformly over all metal surfaces including the crevices. Oxygen
in the crevice is consumed, causing cessation of the anodic reduction in
the crevice. Mobile negative ions, SO!.-- for example, migrate to the
crevice to maintain charge balance. The resulting metal sulfate will
dissociate in the aqueous solution to form metal ions and acid radicals.
The sulfate ions and low pH accelerate the corrosion in a manner similar
to autocatalytic pitting, while the reduction reaction cathodically
protects the exterior surfaces (20).
Fretting is a wear phenomenon occurring between two surfaces having
relative oscillatory motion of small amplitude (<25 micrometers).
Fretting corrosion is a form of fretting in which the chemical reaction
predominates. When wire rope or helical strand are loaded in tension,
the wires in the strands rotate and translate slightly in relation to
each other. Slight bending movement also may occur at tower saddles and
cable bands. At those points, the strands bear against each other with
forces in the range of 3,000 psi (21). Fretting action can erode the
galvanized coating, wearing notches in adjacent wires (which act as
sites for localized corrosive attack). Fretting also rapidly removes
corrosion products and thereby accelerates corrosion (22).
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is a localized form of corrosive
attack that occurs due to the concurrent application of 1) corrosive
attack and 2) a static tensile stress (applied or residual).
Both
factors must be present for cracking to occur. Two theories exist which
explain SCC. The electrochemical theory states that galvanic cells are
created between metal grains and different phases. When an alloy is
stressed in tension, localized electrochemical dissolution of metal
creates a crack. The stress-sorption theory states that SCC proceeds by
weakening of the cohesive bonds between atoms through absorption of
damaging substances (23-25).
Stress corrosion cracks are usually characterized by branching and a
transverse orientation to the applied tensile stress.
One important
characteristic of this phenomena is that low- to moderate-strength
steels tend to undergo sec only by the action of specific environments.
High-strength steels do not appear to require specific corrodants (26).
The SCC environments for steel are shown in Table 1. The magnitude of
stress required to propagate a stress corrosion crack may be well below
the design stress for bridge wires. In most cases, SCC is intermittent
inasmuch as tirue is required for corrodants to diffuse to localized
points of high stress and to damage the metal.
Several ions and substances known to cause SCC of steels similar to
bridge wire may be found in normal industrial atmospheres (27).
Some
process(es)
is
(are)
usually
required
to achieve a
suitable
concentration of those atmospheric pollutants to affect the material.
Crevices are a good site for the concentration of impurities by
leaching, decomposition, and corrosion. Condensation-evaporation cycles
are another way for high corrodant concentrations to be achieved.
On
each drying cycle, pollutants are retained on the material surface and
are available for intensified attack on the next moisture renewal cycle.
Factors affecting the rate of SCC include nature and magnitude of
the applied stress, environmental temperature, humidity, pH of the
6
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TABLE 1.

Crevice Corrosion Model.

CORRODANTS SPECIFIC TO THE STRESS CORROSION
OF STEEL AT ROOM TEMPERATURE (30, p 210)

CORRODANT

ALLOY

Cl2 (gas)

High Strength-Low Alloy

HCl and HBr

High Strength-Low Alloy

H

2 (gas)

High Strength-Low Alloy

H2s (gas)

High Strength-Low Alloy

Sulfide impurities

Medium to High-Strength

in aqueous solutions

Steels (hydrogen cracking)

MnS and MnSe

High-Strength Steels

Nitrates in aqueous

Carbon Steels

solutions
High-Strength Steels

Arsenic, antimony, and

(hydrogen cracking)

bismuth ions in aqueous
solutions
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corrodant, concentration of the corroding solution, and physical nature
of the corrodant. Geometric defects such as notches and pits may serve
as stress raisers and increase the rate of sec attack.
At low applied stresses (below KISCC (the stress intensity at the
crack tip)), crack growth rate is proportional to increases in stress
intensity.
Above KISCC
the crack growth rate is unaffected by
increases in stress interrsity.
The growth rate is probably controlled
by rate-limiting processes such as diffusion. Crack branching occurs at
this K-independant regime (28).
Metallurgical factors that make ferrous alloys more susceptible to
SCC are grain size, amount of cold working, alloy content, and content
of certain residual elements. Carbide-forming alloying elements such as
Mo, V, and Ti help resist SCC. Alloying and residual elements such as
C, Mn, S, and P increase SCC susceptibility.
Hydrogen stress cracking is a form of structural deterioration
usually associated with sec.. It requires a stressed, high-strength
steel and an environment that will furnish hydrogen ions. Unlike SCC,
1) there are no specific damaging solutions related to a given metal, 2)
cathodic protection will not prevent cracking, and 3) a corrosion
reaction is not required for hydrogen to enter a metal and cause
cracking. Environments that may furnish hydrogen include water, moist
air, hydrocarbons, acids, and H2 S gas.
Hydrogen stress cracking is similar to SCC described by the stresssorption theory. Hydrogen, either present in the metal or furnished by
other corrosion mechanisms, is diffused by stress gradients to points of
attack, weakening metal bonds and thereby facilitating cracking. The
presence of certain residual elements also promotes a susceptibility to
hydrogen stress cracking. Bainitic and martensitic microstructures are
very susceptible to hydrogen attack, even in the cold-worked condition.
This is one reason hydrogen stress cracking usually takes place in
steels with tensile strengths exceeding 150 ksi. A minimum stress is
required to initiate hydrogen stress cracking, but this is well below
practical design stress levels and may be associated with residual
stresses.
Hydrogen sulfide, H S, is the atmospheric pollutant most
2
commonly associated with hydrogen stress cracking (29, 30).
Molecular hydrogen, H , has limited diffusion capabilities in steel,
2
usually associated with very high temperatures.
Steel charged with
molecular or atomic hydrogen can exhibit slow strain embrittlement,
which usually occurs at 40 percent of the yield strength.
Maximum
susceptibility is at room temperature (31). When molecular hydrogen is
involved, the hydrogen must have been previously charged into the steel
at elevated temperatures. Delayed failure, termed "static fatigue", is
hydrogen-induced cracking under static load.
Those cracks usually
initiate in the interior of the material and will usually not show signs
of crack branching.
Corrosion-related hydrogen problems are caused by
atomic hydrogen.
In electrochemical corrosion of steel, different areas of the metal
surface become cathodic or anodic.
At the cathode, one important
reaction is

Catalysts such as compounds of arsenic, phosphorous, or hydrogen sulfide
8

may suppress that reaction.
Hydrogen atoms generated by uniform
corrosion may accumulate at the metal surface and subsequently diffuse
into the metal, causing hydrogen stress cracking. Those compounds are
called •• cathodic poisons". In the case of steel exposed to an aqueous
solution, only a few parts per million of H S is sufficient to act as a
2
cathodic poison. Cold-working lowers the resistance of steel to that
type of cracking.
Aqueous solutions without much oxygen may be
favorable to the evolution of hydrogen ions, as the _lack of free oxygen
prevents oxidation of those ions (32).
Local corrosion taking place within a notch or crack may produce pH
and corrosion-potential conditions at the notch tip much different than
those existing on the specimen surface. Hydrogen may be generated at
those notches, though the surface would not reveal any unusual, gross,
corrosion activity. Applied anodic potentials that cause pitting may
produce hydrogen stress cracks due to hydrogen generation in the pits.
Corrosion fatigue is cracking caused by fluctuating stresses in the
presence of a co'rrosive environment (33-35).
The sum of the damage
generated in such an environment is much greater than when one of the
factors was missing or when they acted alternately. Like SCC, corrosion
fatigue is capable of nucleating and growing a crack in a material until
failure occurs. However, unlike SCC, a specific corrosive environment
is not required. Corrosion fatigue may act in concert with general
corrosion, pitting, hydrogen cracking, or sec.
The behavior of
corrosion fatigue has been modeled by Wei and Simmons (36) as follows:
da/dNc = (da/dNSCC) + (da/dNr) + (da/dNcf)
in which

da/dN

=

c

da/dNSCC
da/dN

corrosion fatigue crack propagation rate,

= contribution

of the environment to attack,

inert (no environment effect) fatigue
propagation rate,
da/dN f = synergistic effect of fatigue and stress
c
corrosion,
·
da = increment of crack growth, and
dN = increment of stress cycling.
r

=

At high loading frequencies and low stress amplitudes, the cycledependent term usually predominates. At low loading frequencies, slow
loading rates, prolonged exposure at peak stresses, high stress
amplitudes, and inaggressive environments, the environmental term
usually has greater influence. The synergystic term is a result of the
interaction of new crack surfaces produced by fatigue and the
environment. The interaction may be thought of in two ways: corrosionaided fatigue processes or fatigue-aided corrosion processes.
If the
material is subjected to a static tensile stress, the effect of a cyclic
tensile load will be to open the crack, not only increasing the cracktip stress intensity, but also increasing the likelihood that a
corrodant will penetrate to the crack tip.
Corrosion fatigue will lower the cyclic life of steel compared to
air-tested fatigue strength. A high-strength steel may lose up to 10
percent of its air-tested fatigue strength when subjected to plain
moisture (37).
In the presence of active corrodants, the loss of
9

fatigue strength will be much greater. Steels subjected to corrosion
fatigue do not show a- fatigue limit.
Nucleation or propagation of
corrosion fatigue cracks is influenced by the corrosive environment,
mainly bulk aqueous solutions or periodic vapor condensation.
In carbon steels, corrosion fatigue cracks usually (but not always)
initiate at corrosion pits that are large and contain significant
amounts of corrosion products. Cracks generated by corrosion fatigue
tend to be transgranular and may show some crack branching. Multiple
surface cracks are another sign of corrosion fatigue. River patterns on
fracture surfaces, which are typically associated with normal fatigue
failures, may be suppressed in corrosion fatigue.
HISTORY OF SUSPENSION BRIDGE
WIRE CORROSION PROBLEMS
In his book, !::_ Practical Treatise on Suspension Bridges (38), the
noted suspension Bridge designer, D. B. Steinman, commented, "For the
cables of the Portsmouth bridge, bright wire was adopted instead of the
more customary galvanized wire, on account of the faith of the designing
engineers in the adequacy of the protection afforded by modern cable
wrapping. • • • The cables of the Williamsburg Bridge, made of bright
wire, are in an excellent state of preservation.
When Roebling's
Niagara railway suspension bridge was taken down, • • • the bright wire
composing the cables was found free of rust.
Except possibly for
coastal locations exposed to salt air, the author would unhesitatingly
recommend the use of ungalvanized wire for bridge cables; with the
proviso, of course, that the outside of the cables be suitably protected
with tight wire wrapping."
Apparently,
Steinman was unaware his statements about
the
Williamsburg and Niagara bridges were incorrect. This fact would become
evident some 11 years after his book was published, when the cables of
the Portsmouth Bridge cable first suffered corrosion problems.
In
defense of Steinman, it can be noted that other prominent bridge
designers shared his view. Unfortunately, the general confidence held
by those individuals did not reflect historical evidence about
suspension bridge cable corrosion problems up to that time.
In the early to mid-nineteenth century, several French suspension
bridges failed due to corrosion in the anchorages. Roebling's Niagara
Bridge showed signs of corrosion during an inspection in 1877. Wires on
the undersides of the cables were rusted and more severe wire corrosion
was found at the entrance to the mortar-encased anchorage.
Corroded
wires in the anchorages were removed and replaced with spliced pieces of
wire. In 1883, Roebling's Sixth Street Bridge over the Allegheny River
at Pittsburg suffered cable corrosion at the anchorages. That problem
was remedied by cutting out the corroded wires and splicing wire
"hairpins" about the anchorage shoes (39).
In 1893, the mortar-encased anchorages of Roebling's Ohio Bridge at
Covington, Kentucky, were opened to inspect the wire strands.
The
inspection was prompted by corrosion problems in the mortar-encased
anchorages of several ·other Roebling bridges. Mortar in the anchorages
was moist and, at points adjacent to the strands, covered with rust.
The strands were encrusted in mortar. However, when cleaned, the outer
wires of the strands showed considerable loss of section, though the
10

wires inside the strands were in good condition. A number of broken
wires, apparently severed by uniform corrosion, were found. Those were
repaired with wire splices. It was estimated that corrosion had reduced
the strength of the cables by about 12 percent.
To remedy this,
auxiliary eyebars were connected, running from friction collars outside
the anchorages to the strand shoe pins (Figure 2).
In each anchor
house, the strands and anchorage assemblies were enclosed in a sheetmetal tanks filled with paraffin oil, and later wax, to protect the
strands from further oxidation (40). Those tanks were removed at a
later date.
In 1905, a suspension bridge at Charleston, West Virginia, failed,
killing several people. It was later determined that one of the main
cables parted due to corrosion in the anchorage. Three years later, a
suspension bridge in Morgantown, West Virginia, was closed, due
partially to corrosion of the cables (41).
The Kelso Bridge, over the Cowlitz River at Kelso, Washington,
collapsed in 1923, with an attendant loss of 12 lives. The 300-foot
span was built in 1907. Again, failure was due to corrosion of the
cables in anchorages (42).
Rusting of the sheet-steel covers on the Williamsburg Bridge led to
the wrapping of the cables in 1921. An inspection of the exterior wires
showed rust discoloration. The corrosion was worse in the main span
where rust stains were found in many places, generally occurring at the
lower ends of panels and under the seizing at the lower part of the
strand.
Cable wires were wedged apart and an examination of the
interior wires revealed no signs of corrosion (43).
In 1928, work was initiated on two large suspension bridges, the Mt.
Hope Bridge at Providence, Rhode Island, and the Ambassador Bridge at
Detroit, Michigan.
Both bridges were to employ a new, untried, heattreated wire that offered potential economic benefits over normal colddrawn wire. Just prior to the completion of the Mt. Hope Bridge cables,
broken wires were detected at tangent points adjacent to strand shoes in
the anchorages.
The number of breaks increased until the load on the
strands was relieved.
An attempt was made to repair the wires by
splicing, but that was intended only as a temporary remedy.
Similar
wire fractures were found on the Ambassador Bridge before the deck
structure had been completed. Additional breaks were found under cable
bands of that bridge (44). The wires, which were galvanized, did not
show signs of corrosion. Shortly after detection of those breaks, the
cables of both bridges were removed, and the heat-treated wire was
replaced with conventional cold-drawn wire (45, 46). Heat-treated wire
was never again used on a suspension bridge.
The Portsmouth Bridge was completed in 1927.
During an annual
inspection in May 1939, cracks were observed in the main cables and the
bridge was subsequently closed to traffic.
The first breaks were
located in anchor houses between the splay saddles and the anchor shoes.
Most breaks were in the anchorages on the Ohio bank, which were
previously inundated by flood waters. All anchor houses were damp. The
dampness may have been partially attributable to the sand-filled
anchorages. Wires in the anchor houses had been coated with asphalt for
rust protection. However, that coating was ineffective. Asphalt wire
coatings had been proven to be ineffective some 50 years previous (47).
After removing the asphalt coating, many wires in the anchor houses were
observed to be corroded and broken.
Wrapping of the main cable was
11

Figure 2.

Friction Collar on the Ohio Bridge at Covington.
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removed at many points, and the cables were plied apart by wedging to
examine interior wires. The outer layer of cable appeared to be in fair
condition; however, the interior was fused by dried paint and rust.
Some wires were completely rusted through. Watchmen were placed in the
anchor houses and reported that they could hear wires fracture on quiet
nights.
Nost breaks were found on the upstream cable; 198 occurring in the
Ohio anchorage, and 110 in the Kentucky anchorage.
On the downstream
cable, 60 breaks were found in the Ohio anchorage and none in the
Kentucky anchorage (48).
There was a slight imbalance in the main cable loading due to design
of the roadway.
The imbalance placed heavier loads on the upstream
cable.
In 1940, the American Bridge Company, under the supervision of
Modjeski and Masters Consulting Engineers, recabled the bridge. At that
time, the bridge was owned by the Fullerton-Portsmouth Bridge Company.
To overcome flooding problems in the anchorages, the anchorage
eye bars were extended and elevated outside the anchor blocks. The new
cables consisted of 19 shop-fabricated, prestressed, galvanized helical
strands, of which 13 were 1-3/4-inch diameter and 6 were 1-1/4-inch
diameter. Each strand was pulled over the bents and towers by temporary
sheaves on a hauling line and lowered into place. As with the Maysville
Bridge, aluminum fillers were used to give the cables a circular cross
section. The cables were then wrapped with a soft galvanized wire. The
truss and suspenders, which were removed prior to demolition of the
original cables, were reinstalled and new anchor connections also were
constructed to accept the wire rope.
A concrete deck replaced the
initial wood-asphalt installation. The new cable had a total effective
cross section of 31.4 square inches compared to 30.04 square inches of
the original cables.
After the first Portsmouth cable replacement,
bright wire was never used in an American suspension bridge. At least
four American suspension bridges that employed bright wire are still in
service.
In November 1939, the 450-foot main-span Hidalgo-Reynosa Suspension
Bridge, over the Rio Grande at Hidalgo, Texas, collapsed, killing one
person ( 49). The failure was attributed to fracture of wires due to
electrolytic corrosion in an anchorage. After the bridge was rebuilt in
1941, a series of tests was conducted to determine if ground currents
were present in the cables. Those tests indicated electrolytic currents
were flowing from each cable at the rate of 25-26 milliamperes at a
potential of 0.4 volts.
To neutralize that, the cable was given a
cathodic protection system consisting of a two-volt wet-cell battery and
a two-ampere charging unit. The system eliminated ground current (50).
In 1941, general remedial work was initiated on the suspension
bridge over the Ohio River at Steubenville, Ohio. Examination of the
concrete-encased wires in the anchorages revealed the wires (which were
in direct contact with concrete) to be severely corroded in both
anchorages. The bridge had been in service for 35 years.
To remedy the problem, temporary friction hitches were installed
beyond the points of corrosion. The looped ends of the strands were cut
beyond the points of corrosion damage. Socket fittings were attached to
the newly cut strand ends. The other end of the sockets were connected
to the anchorage eyebars by steel bar and U-bolt assemblies (51).
During 1967-1969, an inspection was conducted on the 2-11/16-inch
13
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diameter ropes of that bridge. Many of those ropes required replacement
due to severe corrosion· in the lower portion of the ropes. In other
portions, the zinc coating was depleted. The worst corrosion was in the
lowest portions of the ropes and at locations where the ropes had been
wrapped with wire to prevent abrasion with a truss-guide casting.
The Portsmouth Bridge was operated from 1940 to 1974 by the Ohio
Bridge Commission. Thereafter, it was owned by the Ohio Department of
Transportation. Official reports stated the condition of the bridge was
generally good up to 1973 (52). The bridge was painted last in 1967.
However, a 1974 inspection disclosed cracked paint on the cables, light
rust the on undersides of the cables, rust spots on the undersides of
cable bands, and loose caulking at the cable bands. Free moisture also
was observed at the bands.
In 1975, the cables were unwrapped at six of the lowest panels and
inspected.
The strands at the end bents were in good condition.
However, at the center of the main span, the zinc coating was depleted
and the wires were rusted. A few broken wires were found at that time.
In May 1978, a general rehabilitation program was initiated for the
bridge.
Included in this plan was work to remove the wrapping wire,
clean any uniform corrosion, and rewrap the cable with a neoprene tape.
However, as unwrapping proceeded on the downstream Ohio side, wires in
the center section of the side span were badly corroded. Many breaks
also were observed.
Seventy-seven fractures were found in one panel
(53).
In June, a detailed investigation of the status of the main
cables was conducted, examining several panels of the downstream side on
several spans. On the side span, the greatest damage was detected in
the central panels between the bent and the tower.
Little corrosion
could be found in the cables at the bent or towers.
Severe uniform corrosion was observed in the lower strands of
cables. Wires in the upper strands appeared to be in good condition,
with little corrosion of the zinc coating. No breaks were detected in
the cable where galvanizing was not deteriorated. A heavy amount of
corrosion products was observed in the lower wires.
Cracking was
detected only in severely corroded wires. The lowest section of the
main cable, which had been .unwrapped, was resealed with a protective
tape.
Several days after a storm, more than a quart of water was
drained after the patch was punctured.
On completion of a report from Battelle Laboratories of Columbus,
Ohio, the bridge was closed to traffic. The bridge cables were replaced
with structural strand having Class C galvanizing, and the bridge was
reopened to traffic in December 1979.
The 1, 065-foot main-span Kohl brand cable-stayed bridge at Hamburg,
Germany, was completed in 1974. Signs of corrosion surfaced in 1976.
An attempt was made to protect the cables (apparently bright wire) with
a plastic coating.
An official report stated the coating was
ineffective and the cables suffered uniform corrosion due to the
entrainment of moisture and salt kicked up from the roadway. The lower
portions of the strands swelled due to the corrosion. Apparently, the
plastic coating failed due to poor workmanship. The bridge was to be
recabled with galvanized wire, and the work was scheduled for completion
in fall of 1979 (54).
In 1978, an inspection was performed on the 130 year-old Wheeling,
West Virginia, bridge.
The four main cables were unwrapped at 13
locations.
At one location, 15 broken wires were found.
As the
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inspection revealed severe deterioration of the wrapping wire, the work
was extended to unwrapping all main cables. At one point, 50 broken
wires were detected.
About 85 other wires showed 50-percent section
loss (55, 56). The cables have been renovated. Work was completed in
1982.
As a result of the Federal Surface Transportation Act of 1978,
inspections were conducted on bridges in the New York City area. Those
inspections revealed, in part, corrosion on the stay cables of Brooklyn
Bridge at entrances into the towers (57). On June 29, 1981, shortly
after those inspections, two stays snapped, killing a pedestrian. The
probable cause of failure was listed as corrosion due to atmospheric
corrosion or bird droppings.
Those inspections also "revealed severe corrosion and abrasive wear
to wires of the Williamsburg Bridge (58). The problem was attributed in
part to the unusual corrosion protection system (graphite and
petrolatum). It has been suggested the graphite acted as an abrasive,
exacerbating the fretting action of the cables (59).
Possibly, the
petrolatum interacted with moisture, forming acids promoting gradual
deterioration of the wires.
In 1978, signs of wire breakage were detected in the suspenders of
the Severn Bridge (60). This led to the replacement of 49 suspenders,
with plans to replace the remainder.
Failures were attributed to
fatigue cracking that interacted with corrosion.
In 1978, severe corrosion damage was detected in the stay cables of
the 16-year old Lake Maracaibo Bridge, Venezuela (61). Several months
later, one stay broke. Failures were attributed to high humid! ty and
the high salinity of the lake. All 2.9-inch diameter stay cables on the
bridge were replaced over a two-year period at a cost of 50 million
dollars.
On April 12, 1982, a two-truck collision on the Chiriqui River
suspension bridge in Panama sheared several suspender ropes. The 45
year-old, American-built bridge collapsed. A subsequent investigation
revealed the hanger cables had been significantly weakened by rust. One
strand had lost two-thirds of its cross section due to corrosion (62).
LABORATORY TESTS OF WIRE
After failure of heat-treated wires on the Mt. Hope and Ambassador
bridges, the National Bureau of Standards initiated a study, probably
the first major laboratory analysis of suspension bridge wire failures.
A formal report was issued by the Bureau of Standards in 1936, six years
after the study was undertaken (63).
Wire furnished to the Bureau of Standards' investigators was from
the Mt. Hope Bridge. Both the Mt. Hope and Ambassador bridges used
similar wire from the same mill. The wire was made from basic openhearth steel.
After being cold-drawn, it was heat-treated, acidcleaned, and galvanized. The resulting combination was not altogether
satisfactory and 4,000 of the 30,000 coils of wire made at the mill were
rejected.
Mill rejections were due to poor surface finish after
galvanizing, failure to meet specifications, or spontaneous fracture.
Heat-treated wires had poorer surface finish than comparable cold-worked
wire.
Tensile test specimens sometimes failed with no reduction in
area.
The investigators believed shop fractures were due to hydrogen
15
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embrittlement. Wires that were not acid-dipped and galvanized did not
break.
The investigators stated that the effects of hydrogen
embrittlement were transitory.
Therefore, they felt that hydrogen did
not cause field problems.
The heat-treated wire was stiff. In the field, the wires were bent
around temporary shoes to form anchorage loops.
The Bureau of
Standards' investigators criticized workmanship in those locations.
However, laboratory tests on bent-wire specimens did not show the
bending operation to be critical to failure.
Fatigue tests were
conducted, using both heat-treated and cold-worked wire (64, 65).
Fatigue limits of both types of wires was similar, though it was noted
that galvanizing of either wire type reduced the fatigue limit.
A
special jig was arranged to fatigue wire hairpin specimens, one end of
the wire was fixed and the wire looped about a jig, resembling an1anchor
shoe. The other end of the wire was fatigue cycled in tension. Heattreated wire
specimens had lower
fatigue
limits
{though not
substantially lower) than cold-worked wires, and the spread of results
was greater for heat-treated wire. Some fracture surfaces of the heattreated fatigue specimens resembled field failures.
Based on those
results, the Mt. Hope and Ambassador bridge problems were ascribed to
fatigue by Bureau of Standards' researchers.
After the 1940 recabling of the Portsmouth Bridge, specimens of the
original wire were sent to the Carnegie Institute of Technology for
physical inspection. The wires had assumed the approximate curvature of
the mill reels from which they were spun. All samples received from the
Ohio side were badly pitted and rusted. Those from the Kentucky side
were only slightly rusted.
Specimens from the periphery of the main
cables were only slightly rusted, while those from the interior showed
severe pitting.
Tensile tests of specimens distant from the field
fractures revealed strengths between 242-265 KSI. Tests of specimens
near the breaks had tensile strengths of 132-261 KSI {presumably based
on the original wire cross-sectional area). Reductions in area of test
fracture surfaces varied from 19-47 percent for specimens distant to the
breaks and from 6-37 percent for specimens close to the field fractures.
All specimens having strengths less than the specified minimum (220
ksi) showed evidence of pre-existent cracks. Microscopic tests revealed
both radial and longitudinal cracks in some specimens.
Some wires
showed numerous transverse surface cracks.
The fractures exhibited
branching and traveled on irregular paths into the wire. Crack paths
tended to deviate from inward movement as greater depths of penetration
were obtained.
The report (66) on the examination stated: "Only those (wires) at
the anchorage shoes seemed dangerously brittle. At these locations, the
wire appears to have been subjected to a combination of stress and
corrosion resulting in stress-corrosion cracks.
Specimens from other
locations, in spite of corrosion, seem to have suffered no important
deterioration of mechanical properties.
These latter tests have not
been extensive.'"
In August 1940, the National Bureau of Standards received samples of
the original Portsmouth Bridge wire.
Tests were performed on those
wires in an effort to produce sec in the wire using various components
of industrial atmospheres. A microscopic examination of typical service
fractures showed the failures to be transverse to the longitudinal axis
for a short distance from the wire surface. The crack changed to a
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slanting fracture as it penetrated into the wire. Most wires had cracks
on the concave side of the residual bow. Truit side would be in tension
if the wire were straightened. The composition of the wire is shown in
Table 2.
A series of SCC tests was conducted by the National Bureau of
Standards by immersing specimens of the Portsmouth and heat-treated and
cold-worked Mt. Hope wires in various aqueous solutions:
ammonium
nitrate, ammonium nitrite, ammonium sulfate, ammonium hydroxide, sodium
nitrate and distilled water.
Some bowed Portsmouth specimens were
straightened and immersed in aqueous solutions.
Other Portsmouth
specimens were bent more severely than the residual set.
All other
specimens tested also were bent. The maximum tensile stress on the bent
specimens was calculated to be in the range of 90-200 ksi at the outer
fibers.
After 40 months in distilled water, the Portsmouth wire showed some
general corrosion and severe pitting. At points near the water line,
the wire showed a reduction in diameter up to 50 percent.
Ammonium
sulfate produced heavy general corrosion, reducing the wire diameter up
to 60 percent. Ammonium nitrite and sodium hydroxide proved to be good
inhibitors in the concentrations used (0.01 N).
Eleven of the 14 bowed Portsmouth wires immersed in 0.01 N solutions
of ammonium nitrate and sodium nitrate developed stress-corrosion cracks
and completely fractured. The maximum time for failure was 9.5 months.
In each case, fracture initiated perpendicular to the wire surface,
propagating transversely for a short distance in that manner and then
becoming diagonal. The slanting fractures were intercrystalline. Most
cracks occurred on the convex side of the bow. However, two cracks on
the concave side were assumed to have been created in service.
Two
uncracked specimens suffered severe local pitting on the concave side of
the bow, which led to failure.
The lowest stressed specimen (90 ksi)
did not fail and only developed pitting near the immersion line.
Pollard, author of the National Bureau of Standards report,
concluded the cause of the Portsmouth Bridge corrosion problem was
stress corrosion and felt the labor a tory results confirmed the earlier
tentative assumption of the Carnegie Institute of Technology (67).
A bowed Mt. Hope (heat-treated) wire te.sted in ammonium nitrate
developed numerous stress-corrosion cracks.
However, those remained
transverse to the wire axis.
A bowed cold-drawn wire of the type used
to replace the original ~It. Hope cables did not fail after 39.5 months
exposure to ammonium nitrate. Howev:er, it developed extensive pitting
near the immersion line.
Laboratory tests of the Portsmouth Bridge second cables were made in
1978 by Battelle Laboratories of Columbus, Ohio. That work was preceded
by a field inspection of the unwrapped Portsmouth Bridge cables by
Battelle on June 22, 1978.
Chemical analysis of the wire showed it
conformed to original specifications.
Visual inspection of specimens
revealed substantial uniform corrosion, with the wires coated by a thick
scale.
Transverse cracks were found in some badly corroded wires.
Those cracks penetrated halfway in to the wires and changed orientation,
45 degrees to the longitudinal axis of the wires. Secondary cracks were
observed in one specimen. That specimen showed consolidation of surface
cracks, crack branching, and crack orientation transverse to the wire
length.
Scanning electron microscopic (SEM) analyses of fracture faces
were not helpful due to gross corrosion on fracture surfaces. A black
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TABLE 2.

,_.
00

CHEMICAL CONTENTS OF TYPICAL BRIDGE WIRES (PERCENT BY WEIGHT)

ELEMENTS

MAYSVILLE BRIDGE

PORTSMOUTH
BRIDGE
(ORIGINAL) 2

Carbon

0.85 Max

0.69 - 0.84

0.85 Maxa - 0.8ob

0.65 - 0.78

Sulphur

0 .ot, Max

0.031 - 0.037

0.04 Max - 0.039

0.21 - 0.033

Phosphorus

0.04 Max

0.008 - 0.014

0.04 Max - 0.029

Magnesium

N/A

N/A

0.66

Silicon

N/A

0.03- 0.14

0.23

Nickle

N/A

N/A

N/A

0.01 - 0.11

Chrome

N/A

N/A

N/A

0.10

1.
2.
3.
4.
N/A

PORTSMOUTH
BRIDGE
(REPLACEMENT))

MODERN
4
BRIDGE WIRE

0.01
0.20 - 0.78
0.10

From Maysville Bridge Specifications (Ref 88, p 88)
From Laboratory Analysis (Ref 67, p 438)
(~) From Portsmouth Bridge Specifications (Ref 68, p 12); (b) From Laboratory Analysis (Ref 68, p 14)
From Laboratory Analysis (Ref 72, p 49)
- Not Available

corrosion product was found on the fracture faces.
The only explicable
impurity identified in the corrosion product was sulphur.
Payer and others, in the Battelle Report, assumed the sulphur was a
residual byproduct of either so or H S. However, no definite corrodant
2
2
was identified.
In referring to the previous National Bureau of
Standards' report, they concluded the second set of Portsmouth cables
probably suffered sec and recommended that those cables be replaced
(68).
A chemical analysis of the wire steel did not disclose any
abnormally high concentrations of harmful elements. Traces of aluminum
and lead detected in that analysis may have been due to their use in the
zinc coating operation.
,
In 1978, at the request of the Federal Highway Administration, a
series of tests on the Portsmouth Bridge second cable wire was performed
by the Fairbank Highway Research Station.
Included in the work were
mechanical tests, chemical analyses, and fractographic analyses.
Surface chemical analyses, determined by SEM, revealed the presence
of sulfur.
A chemical analysis of the wire did not disclose any
abnormally high concentrations of harmful elements.
The as-received
wire showed hydrogen concentrations of 212-220 ppm.
The cleaned wire
showed a hydrogen content of 0.6-0.7 ppm. Mechanical tests revealed a
reduction in area of 28 percent, an elongation of 3 percent (on a
1. 5-inch gage section), and an ultimate tensile strength of 236 ksi.
Fracture /fughness tests revealed low toughness values, averaging 38
1
ksi-inch
• It should be noted that those fracture toughness tests did
not meet any accepted standard.
Fractographic inspection by SEM revealed the fracture initiated at
corrosion pits perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the wire.
The
fracture surface was inclined at an angle of 40-50 degrees to the
corrosion pit.
No evidence of plastic deformation was evident at the
fracture surfaces. The researchers concluded that the field fractures
were typical of stress corrosion cracks. The report also suggested that
hydrogen embrittlement, due to the galvanizing process, could be a
contributory cause of failure (69).
A fourth general investigation, which dealt with the problem of SCC,
was initiated by the Federal Highway Administration (70, 71).
The
performing contractor was the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company of
Seattle, Washington.
Tests were performed on various sizes of virgin
bridge wire of both the bare and galvanized types.
Specimens were
prestretched to remove bending set imparted by the wire reels.
Properties of the wires are shown in Tables 2 and 3~
Prior to testing, the wires were given a circumferential notch in
the gage section. A plastic cup was placed around the notch, allowing
it to be immersed in test solutions.
Those assemblies were placed in
test fixtures that allowed application of tensile loads.
Aqueous
solutions used in the tests were 50 ppm H S solution, 50 ppm so
2
2
solution, and 5 percent calcium nitrate - 0.25 percent ammonium nitrate
solution.
Wire specimens were loaded to 40 percent of the ultimate
tensile strength. Test exposures ranged from 40 - 59.5 weeks.
Extensive general corrosion was observed in bare wire in all tests.
A white residue, believed to be a corrosion product of zinc, was noted
on galvanized wires.
However, no SCC was detected in any of the test
specimens (72).
A narrative report on the second Portsmouth Bridge cable corrosion
was compiled by the Ohio Department of Transportation in April 1980
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(73). The report gives a detailed history of the bridge relevant to the
recent corrosion problem.
It includes field observations of the
corroded cables by inspectors prior to the recabling operation.
An
overview was presented on relevant research related to the corrosion of
wires.
An article in the May 14, 1982, Engineering News Record (ENR)
commented on a draft report from Great Britain's National Physical
Laboratory (NPL) on hydrogen embrittlement failures of prestressing
strands (74). The ENR article referenced the failure of several wires
on the Hood Canal Floating Bridge that the NPL attributed to hydrogen
attack. The article mentioned that a bituminous film had been used
unsuccessfully to protect the wires. The NPL report, in part, concerned
exterior tendons in the Braidley Road Bridge at Bournemouten, a
prestressed box girder bridge built in 1970. Wires began failing within
a year of initial service; and within eight years, two complete tendons
had broken.
The tendons were coated with an aluminum-resin mix and
wrapped in polyvinyl chloride. NPL stated that moisture penetrated the
coating, causing corrosion by oxidation that, in turn, released hydrogen
that made the wires brittle.
The ENR article mentioned that cyclic
traffic loads aggravated the cracks.
Another bridge covered by the NPL report was the 14-year-old
Scotswood Bridge in Newcastle, England.
The bridge was a tied-arch
structure. The tie chords were box beams having tension strands in the
boxes. In 1981, inspectors found 18 inches of water in the box beams.
Two of the 28 strands were observed lying slack. The strands had been
wrapped in a mastic-impregnated fabric tape.
At the strand ends,
congestion precluded wrapping and the ends were painted with red lead.
Inspection revealed most of the wires failed in the painted zone though
fraying was evident in three strands when the tape was removed.
The ENR article noted that several British corrosion experts,
including the NPL, attributed both British bridge failures to hydrogen
embrittlement. The article dispelled the notion that cold-drawn wire
was not susceptible to hydrogen attack. The NPL report also stated that
encasing prestressing wires in grout would prevent that problem. The
ENR article also quQted another British official who was not confitlent
of that statement.
The ENR article also noted some scientists had stated the Severn
Bridge suspension cable cracking was aggravated by galvanized-induced
hydrogen attack. However, others had contended the problem was due to
corrosion and fatigue.
SUSPENSION BRIDGE INVESTIGATIONS IN KENTUCKY
Reserach with bridge wire dates to 1974, when a wire-rope suspender
from the Ohio Bridge at Covington, Kentucky, was inspected for signs of
corrosion damage.
Initial field inspections of the Portsmouth,
Covington (Ohio Bridge), and Maysville bridges were performed between
May and December 1979. Laboratory examinations of wire specimens from
the Portsmouth and Covington bridges also were conducted during that
period.
The most recent investigation was an inspection of the
Maysville Bridge in November 1982. Most of that work has been reported
previously (75).
This section is a summary of investigations in
Kentucky pertaining to the corrosion of bridge wire.
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In early 1974, the Kentucky Department of Transportation removed a
suspender rope from the Ohio Bridge. The rope was a central suspender
(one of the original suspenders installed by Roebling). The suspender,
approximately 15 feet long, was removed from the downstream cable of the
Ohio side span. The rope had shown signs of swelling in the lower
portion, adjacent to the end fitting.
It was replaced by a solid
1. 75-inch diameter steel rod. The suspender was
7 x 7 strand, No. 9
gage wire, having a nominal diameter of about 1.5 inches. The wire was
made of wrought iron, drawn and fabricated by Roebling.
Since those
strands supported a third of the main span load, it was necessary to
determine the corrosion damage experienced by that "worst-case"
suspender.
The rope was sectioned by cross-cutting slices with a pipe saw.
Interior sections were visually inspected. Slight swelling of the rope
was evident near the lower end fitting; however, the wires showed no
signs of gross corrosion (Figure 3). Interstices of the swollen section
were filled with rust particles and quartz sand.
Sand particles were
probably embedded by a previous sand-blasting operation.
It was
concluded the suspender was in good condition and no further tests were
performed ( 7 6).
Field inspections of the Portsmouth Bridge began in May 1979.
Cables had been unwrapped prior to the winter of 1978. At the time of
the first inspections, cable bands were still in place. During the
inspections, a survey was made of the condition of the external strands
(Figure 4).
Exterior strands were severely corroded in many locations. At one
panel point or another, the exterior strands of both cables showed
ferrous corrosion (rust). Uniform corrosion was much more severe on the
main span and Ohio side span than the Kentucky side span.
The
downstream cable had more panels having gross uniform corrosion than the
upstream cable.
Uniform corrosion was evident either on all exterior strands for an
entire panel length (band-to-band) or concentrated in the lower exterior
strands for the entire panel length. Severe rust was present for at
least two consecutive panels, with the exception of Panel 66-67 on the
Kentucky side span, downstream.
Contrary to expectations, severe
rusting was observed on both horizontal and inclined portions of the
cable (Figure 5). Panels where cables were inclined usually had more
exterior rust than neighboring panels of less inclination.
Only one panel (66-67, downstream) had severe rust on the Kentucky
side span. Thirty-three of the forty main-span panels on the downstream
cable were severely rusted.
Twelve of the main-span panels of the
upstream cables showed extensive rusting.
Those were located on the
lowest (shallowest) portion of the cable. Twelve panels of each cable
on the Ohio side span showed severe rust.
All exterior strands showed some degree of zinc corrosion.
In
places where wires had rusted, the zinc coating obviously had failed by
corrosive attack. Zinc corrosion was evidenced by its powdery white
corrosion product deposited on the surface of the strands. On lightly
corroded strands, the white corrosion product was tenaciously attached
to the wires. In areas where heavy zinc corrosion occurred, sometimes
with little o:r no visible rusting, the white corrosion product had a
thick, fluffy texture. The corrosion product could be removed readily
by light scraping with a finger nail. Usually, the steel wire, revealed
21

Figure 3.

Swollen Section of Ohio Bridge Suspender Rope (1974),
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Figure 5.

The Portsmouth Bridge, Downstream Cable, at the Kentucky
Tower (Mainly Stage 2, Except Some Stage 3 on Lower, Outer
Strands) (1979).

Figure 6.

The Portsmouth Bridge, Downstream Cable, on the
Sidespan (Mainly Stage 2 Corrosion Damage)(l979).

Kentucky
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under those locations, ·was lightly rusted and slightly pitted. Spotted
rust was visible in most locations possessing heavy zinc corrosion.
However, rust was not evident in areas of light zinc corrosion.
Nearly all portions of the cables not severely rusted exhibited
large amounts of zinc corrosion. That included 19 panels each, on the
downstream and upstream cables of the Kentucky side span (Figure 6).
Seven panels on the downstream cable and 28 panels on the upstream cable
of the main span showed heavy zinc corrosion, but no appreciable
rusting. Seven panels on both the downstream and upstream cables also
exhibited that behavior.
In certain locations along the cables, the aqueous corrodant had a
washing action (Figure 7).
In those areas, ferrous corrosion and
pitting were severe.
Those locations could be identified by the
relative absence of zinc corrosion product on the surface. Most of
those locations were where the inclination of the cable was relatively
steep.
Portions of the cable from the bents ·to the splay saddles appeared
in good condition, with the exception of the downstream Kentucky side
span, which had some spotted rust. Most individually exposed strands,
from the splay saddles to the anchor assemblies, were also in good
condition, except for some severe zinc corrosion on the lower wires of a
few strands. Panels 0-1 of both Ohio side-span cables were also in good
condition.
Most breaks detected prior to removal of the bands were located in
the lower portion of the exterior strands (Figure 8). Many broken wires
were clustered where
1) most of the galvanizing was depleted by
corrosion, 2) the wires were rusted severely, and 3) the inclination of
the cables was shallow. In areas where little rust was evident, breaks
were infrequent. But, a few were found, individually or clustered in
groups up to ten, usually near cable bands (Figure 9).
That
characteristic was prevalent in many panels on the- Kentucky side span
and on the steeply inclined portions of the main span and Ohio side
span. Few breaks were found in panels having steep slopes, even when
uniform corrosion was severe.
Prior to band removal, some 300-400 breaks had been discovered on
the cables. Portions of the cables under the bands appeared to be more
corroded than adjacent portions (Figure 10). When the main cables were
removed, between June 27 and _July 18, 1979, hundreds of new breaks were
found in the upper interior strands. Most of those were detected after
the s'trands had been pulled through sheaves and grounded on the river
bank; however, none of the strands were completely severed by breaks.
From a rough count of breaks per strand made during the removal
operation, i t was estimated each cable had about 350 broken wires (77).
In early June 1979, 350 feet of the main-span suspended structure
was removed as part of the cable replacement program. The remaining
portions of the truss were supported by temporary stays and A-frames.
Before dismantling the damaged cables, the suspender cables and bands
were removed. When that was accomplished, several important discoveries
were made.
Many drain holes, located in the packing of the vertically split
bands, were improperly installed and did not allow water to drain from
the cables. Though lead wool packing had been well driven into gaps
between the band halves, water had frozen between them and three or four
bands had suffered pop-outs.
Many new wire breaks were detected at
26
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Figure 7.

Stage-4 Deterioration on the Main Span,
also Exhibiting Signs of Washing (1979).

Downstream Cable,

Figure 8.

Breaks Clustered on Longer, Outer strands on Main Span,
Upstream Cable, at Stage 4 Deterioration Site that Does Not
Show Signs of Washing (1979).
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Figure 9.

Wire Fractures Adjacent to a Cable Band (Strands Show Signs
of Early Stage 3 Deterioration)(1979).

Figure 10.

Portsmouth Bridge after Band Removal (Note Corrosion Marks
at Band Locations)(l979).
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points previously covered by bands. Many breaks were discovered on the
upper strands at those locations. Prior to removal of the bands, no
breaks had been observed in the upper strands. Under one band, breaks
were noted on every exterior strand. Inspection of the interior strands
at those points revealed extensive corrosion and new breaks (Figure 11).
Unfortunately, the construction schedule precluded a detailed inspection
of interior strands.
After the strands were removed, specimens were cut from strands for
laboratory examination. The strand profile was maintained by banding
the strand ends prior to sectioning.
The cutting operation was
accomplished with an abrasive cutoff disc mounted on a pavement cutter.
That operation was difficult, as the strand segments tended to curl into
loops. That was probably due to a plastic set acquired when the strands
were mounted on spools, some 40 years ago, or when the strands were bent
about a sheave during the dismantling operation. The wires also had a
tendency to splay apart at the end when a strand was cut.
Specimens were removed from different strands and parts of given
strands that showed various corrosion features.
The specimens were
taken to the laboratory, sectioned, and subjected to visual inspection.
One wire rope suspender, also taken as a specimen, was subjected to only
external visual inspection.
Several samples of strand that had no exterior corrosion were
collected. On separating those specimens, no interior corrosion was
noted, however, the faying surfaces of individual wires exhibited signs
of fretting.
That caused erosion of galvanizing and slight plastic
deformation of the wire. The wires bore continuous longitudinal marks
from contact with neighboring wires in the same layer and transverse
stripes from contact with the adjacent layer of wires that had opposite
lay.
Specimens of the Portsmouth strand also indicated occurrence of
crevice corrosion.
Some specimens appeared to be in good condition,
having only slight zinc corrosion near wire interfaces. When splayed,
those specimens revealed zinc corrosion and spotted rust on the backside
of exterior wires. The second layer of wires was covered with corrosion
products. The third layer was in good condition, as were the other
interior layers (Figure 12).
From the inspections of the Portsmouth Bridge, both prior and
subsequent to the recabling operation, it was determined that galvanized
helical strand experiences four distinct stages of deterioration.
During Stage 1, the strand is in "as new" condition (Figure 13). Zinc
coating has a bright metallic appearance, though some slight spot
corrosion of the zinc may be evident in the form of a thin, white
powdery coating. The strand is in good condition during Stage 2. The
zinc has a dull gray appearance. The white corroded-zinc film may be
present near interfaces and on exterior surfaces of the wires. When the
white film is removed by s~craping, no rust is evident. As previously
mentioned, the second layer of wires may be in worse superficial
condition than the outer layer.
But, as long as the outer layer of
wires is stable, interior wires will probably remain structurally sound.
Much of the strand is covered with a thick, white zinc corrosion product
in Stage 3.
Spotted· rust is also visible on the wires.
When the
corrosion product is scraped off, the steel under the surface reveals
some rust and pitting. Wire fracture by corrosion cracking is possible
in that stage; however, breaks will not be clustered in large numbers,
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Figure 11. Portion of a Cable previously Covered by a Cable Band (Stage
4 Corrosion Damage){l979).
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Figure 12.

Separated Portsmouth Bridge Strand
and Stage 2 Corrosion.

Figure 13.

Showing Fretting Marks

Stage 1 Condition on New Helical Strand.
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except near points of high stress or aqueous corrodant concentration.
In Stage 4, the strand will be severely rusted and pitted. Some zinc
corrosion will be displaced by corrosion of the underlying steel (rust).
The wires will have a speckled brownish-red and white appearance. When
either the loading or corrosion conditions become severe, the strand
will develop many corrosion cracks and readily fail in this stage.
Specimens exhibiting washing showed severe surface rust, pitting and
little retention of the white zinc corrosion product on the exterior
layer of wires. Despite that poor external appearance, the corrosion on
interior wires was often no worse than in specimens previously
described.
Severely corroded wires from locations of poor drainage were
externally similar to the washed specimens, except for presence of a
white zinc corrosion product. Inspection showed all the interior wires
were severely corroded.
Fretting marks were still visible on those
specimens except at points where corrosion had depleted adjacent wires
until they were no longer in close contact. Where close contact was
maintained, neighboring wires wiped away the corrosion product, exposing
the underlying bare metal.
The ends of broken wires exhibited three different fracture
morphologies.
Some wires had complete fractures transverse to the
longitudinal axis of the wires. More commonly, a transverse fracture
emanated from the surface and penetrated about halfway through the wire.
Thereafter,
the fracture reoriented itself 45 degrees to
the
longitudinal axis and penetrated through the wire. A few specimens had
slanting fractures, typical of those examined by Pollard. None of the
sectioned specimens revealed fractures in the internal layers that were
not preceeded by fractures in the external layer of wires. Some broken
wire specimens had a fracture spacing of less than three inches. All
wire specimens having corrosion fractures exhibited complete zinc
corrosion and, at best, some light surface r~sting.
Inspection of wire rope suspenders in the field showed them to be in
fair condition.
The ropes did not show appreciable wear, even though
they were 53 years old at the time of removal. The suspender ropes were
galvanized and painted. The paint was chipping badly at the time of
removal and replacement.
The zinc coating of exposed wires had
deteriorated in places and some rust was evident; however, the rusted
wires were not pitted.
Inspection of the Maysville Bridge (Figure 14) began in June 1979.
The bridge had been in continuous service for 49 years. It had no known
history of corrosion problems. The first three inspections (June-August
1979) consisted of external inspections of wrapped bridge cables and
splayed wire-rope strands inside the bridge anchorages.
Externally, the paint was in fair condition. The cables were last
painted in 1974. Transverse cracks had developed in the paint on the
upper portion of the cables. Paint had peeled from the lower surfaces
of the cables in spots. This usually was observed where inclination of
the cables was slight.
Many points on the undersides of cables,
adjacent to bands, showed signs of frequent peeling in the previous top
coat of paint.
Suspender ropes were in good condition.
Unlike conditions on the
Portsmouth Bridge, which was designed to have drain holes in the lower
packing, only two drain holes were provided per cable on the Maysville
Bridge. Those were located in the lower packing of bands at the center
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Figure 14.

The Maysville Bridge (1977).
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of the main span. The cable was horizontal between the drain-equipped
bands.
Inspection of bands that had no drain holes revealed caulking (lead
wool) on the underside of several bands had been forced out of place.
Rust-colored stains were detected adjacent to many of those pop-outs on
the cast-steel band halves (Figure 15). During an earlier inspection,
after a rain, water was seen dripping from the stained portion of one
band that had suffered a caulking pop-out.
Inspection of the strands in the anchorages revealed them to be in
generally good condition.
The strands had a base coat of red-lead
primer with a top coat of green paint. The paint work appeared to have
been poorly executed. Paint and primer had chipped off many strands.
In spots, the zinc coating was depleted, leaving the usual chaulky white
corrosion product, which was presumed to be zinc oxide.
In closely
inspected areas, no rust was detected under the corroded zinc. The end
portion of strands in the sleeve bushings appeared to be in worse
condition. There was much loose rust and chipped paint in the recesses
of the sleeves. At the splay saddle in the Ohio upstream chamber, there
appeared to be some washing of red lead, or rust, from the exterior
cable that was visible on the lower strands.
In August 1979, bridge maintenance personnel installed seven
inspection ports on the Maysville Bridge (Figure 16).
Those were
located at Panels 0-1, 7-9, 11-13, 59-61, 65-63 and 69-69 on the Ohio
side span and main span (Figure 17). Ports were installed at points
near bands having pop-outs and on panels where cable paint had
deteriorated.
·
Exposed caples revealed that the Maysville Bridge strands, unlike
those on the Portsmouth Bridge, were individually covered with a
generous coating of red lead.
Unfortunately, that coating was
deteriorating, and in many locations, the zinc coating was depleted. At
all inspection sites, corrosion of the zinc coating was worse on the
lower strands.
All exterior strands in Panels 0-1 and 69-69 on the
downstream cable were in very good condition. The upper strands of the
downstream cable, in Panels 11-1~ and 65-63, were also in good
condition; however, many bottom strands had extensive zinc corrosion.
All external strands on the upstream inspection sites had zinc
corrosion. Several dark rust spots were visible on the lower strands at
Panel 59-61, downstream, and at Panel 65-63, upstream (Figure 18). The
zinc coating in those areas was severely depleted. Except for a few
large rust spots, no pitting or light rust was detected under the zinc
oxide.
At several sites, a small amount of wat~r seeped from the cables
when the wrapping wire was removed.
The red-lead coating was
disintegrating from the lower strands in those locations and the layer
of corroded zinc was thicker than on the upper strands. Some water had
probably flowed to the lower portions of the cable between the wrapping
wire and strands. The interior lower portion of the removed wrapping
wire was corroded, having considerable spotted rust. Apparently, some
retained moisture that settled on the inside of the wrapping had seeped
into the lower portions of the wrapping wire and froze, thereby causing
the paint to peel off.
On December 5, 1979, a follow-up examination of inspection ports was
performed. Several days before the inspection, the Maysville area was
subjected to a heavy rain. Water was dripping from popped-out packing
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Figure 15.

Pop-out and Rust
(1980).

Figure 16.

Installation
(1980).
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Rust Spots on Strands of the Maysville Bridge Cables (Early
Stage 3 Deterioration)(l980).
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at many band locations. When most of the inspection ports were opened,
several quarts of water poured from the cable. Since the port caulking
was in excellent condition at all locations, it was presumed water
entered the cables at the bands or through the wrapping wire and settled
in the ports. Red-lead residue was found on the inspection port covers
located on the bottom face of the cables.
That indicated a flow of
water in the cables sufficient to cause washing.
Because the closed
inspection ports had collected water, drain plugs were left off the port
cover plates on reassembly to minimize drainage.
Inspection of the caulking pop-outs was conducted from the sidewalk
using binoculars.
The frequency of band pop-outs indicated, despite
wire wrapping, the cables are virtually porous. Presence of pop-outs
near the towers revealed a significant amount of water may be entrained,
either at wrapping discontinuities along a single panel, or at a sealing
failure on a band. Seepage of water at a band, one panel lower than
another band having a pop-out, may also indicate that water may be
retained at the bands or by capillary action in the strands. Retention
possibly may be aided by buildup or bridging of corrosion products and
red lead near the pop-out.
On October 18, 1982, a second examination was conducted on the
cables of the Maysville Bridge. One inspection port on the downstream
cable (at Panel 69-69) and another on the upstream cable (at Panel
65-63) were opened. Previously, the cable exposed at Panel 69-69 had
not shown evidence of severe corrosion. The condition of the cable, at
that point, appeared to be unchanged at the time of the second
examination.
The upstream inspection port location previously had
disclosed two rust spots of about one inch in diameter (1979). The
second inspection revealed the rust spots had almost doubled in size.
Also, new rust spots were visible along the lower exterior strands.
No wire breaks were detected on the Maysville Bridge during any
inspection of the bridge cables. Presently, it would be reasonable to
conclude the inspection sites chosen were representative of the entire
bridge, with the possible exception of several locations on the Kentucky
side span and at points under the cable bands.
Inspections were made of the Ohio Bridge at Covington in June _and
September 1979. The scope was similar to examination of the Maysville
Bridge; however, inspection ports were not placed on any of the cables.
Superficial visual examination of the wrapped cables revealed no
major physical defects. The wrapping and paint appeared to be in good
condition. Cables were last painted in 1974. Only a slight amount of
chipped paint was detected. That was in the original upstream cable at
midspan where the cable borders the sidewalk. Rust-colored stains were
visible at some cable bands. The nature of those stains could not be
ascertained due to poor access.
During the inspection, water was
detected dripping from the lower upstream cables near the low point of
the cable at midspan. The leakage was slight and emanated from a splice
in the wrapping. Moderate rusting was detected on suspender ropes near
the bottom sockets.
Previous experience had indicated resulting
corrosion damage to be slight.
An inspection also was made on the secondary cables at the Kentucky
tower roller supports.· The upper cables, located in the tower turrets,
were covered with a thick layer of pigeon droppings. Stay cables also
were covered with pigeon droppings (Figure 19). A bird screen was in
place on the turret aperatures, but the pigeons had obviously penetrated
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Figure 19.

Pigeon Droppings on the Secondary Cables of the Ohio Bridge
(1980).
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the defense. One broken wire was found on the downstream cable at the
roller support.
Anchorages were given the most thorough examination due to the
history of wire corrosion at those locations. Inspection was made of
all four original cable anchor houses. The upstream Kentucky secondary
anchor house door opened directly onto the roadway.
Traffic on the
bridge prevented inspection of that anchorage.
Three original anchor houses (both upstream anchorages and the
Kentucky downstream anchorage) showed evidence of water leaking from the
anchor house roofs. Seepage into the Ohio downstream anchorage was
slight, and anchor assemblies and strands were not damaged.
In the
other original anchorages, water had dripped onto the strands, eyebars,
and anchor assemblies. That leakage caused deterioration of a whitewash
wall-and-ceiling coating.
Wrought-iron roof beams also were rusted.
Dissolved whitewash was deposited as a white residue at spots where the
leaks impinged on wires and anchor assemblies.
All metal surfaces in the anchorage were coated with a thick layer
of red lead. That paint was in good condition in all places where water
had not leaked onto the cables. The leakage had deteriorated the paint
and severely corroded the underlying metal.
Old wire breaks were
observed at the three anchorages that had leakage problems. The number
of breaks ranged from one in the Kentucky downstream anchorage to three
in the Kentucky upstream anchorage (Figure 20). Most broken wire ends
had been painted over, indicating those probably predate the present
leakage problem.
The broken unpainted ends of wires showed severe
uniform corrosion and loss of section near the fractures.
Many wires in the lower strands contained splices that presumably
date back to 1892. Most of those splices were located on the lower
portion of the strands and were inaccessible.
Splices were made by
interlooping mating wire ends and wrapping each looped end to the parent
wire with a tie wire (Figure 21).
That type splice does not provide
high joint strength and was not the type of splice employed by Roebling
on the wires in the main cable. Many of the spliced wires were loose.
It is questionable whether those wires were in tension.
Besides roof leakage, moisture was observed on strands adjacent to
the splay saddle in the downstream Kentucky anchorage.
That may be
caused by leakage of water from the wrapped cable, or by sealin~ failure
at the splay-saddle collar, located outside the anchorage.
The Kentucky secondary cables entered the anchorage through the roof
of each extended anchorage. The strands and anchor assemblies employed
the same paint system used on the original cables. The strands in the
downstream Kentucky secondary anchorage house were covered with light
dust.· The upper surface of the strands were rough in a few locations,
indicating possible presence of light rust under the paint. Excluding
that observation, the paint and strands appeared to be in very good
condition. There was no indication of water leakage onto the strands.
The Ohio secondary cables were housed in separate anchorages located
under the Ohio approach. Cables entered through large open portals in
the headwalls of the anchorages. One unusual feature was the slight
splaying of the cables before they entered the anchorages. The splayed
portion of the cables was sheathed in a sheet-metal jacket that extended
down to the splay saddles. Concrete approach curbs were cast directly
against the cable sheaths where the cables crossed the curbs into the
anchorages.
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Figure 20.

Figure 21.

Broken Wires and Water Leakage Stains in
Kentucky Anchorage of the Ohio Bridge (1980).

the

Upstream

Repair Splice on Wires in Upstream Kentucky Anchorage of the
Ohio Bridge (1980).
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The Ohio secondary anchorages were very dusty.
At the time of
inspection, the bridge trusses were being repainted and the large open
cable portals allowed the sandblast refuse to enter the anchor houses.
Pigeons had frequented the upstream anchor house, depositing droppings
and feathers on the strands. Anchorage roofs were part of the concrete
approach roadway. Some white residue was detected on the upper portions
of several strands, indicating some roof leakage may have taken place.
The strands and anchor assemblies used the same paint system
employed in the other anchorages. At most locations, the paint appeared
to be in good condition.
There was no sign of paint cracking or
peeling; however, the upper surfaces of some strands were slightly
rusted.
Rust was detected under a heavy layer of black sandblast
material that lay on the upper surfaces of the strands.
In both
anchorages, several strands were rusted and swollen between the strand
seizings (Figure 22). Those strands were connected to the lowest strand
shoes on the anchor assemblies near the anchorage floor.
One break was noted in the upper strands of the upstream anchor
house. The break was located near the cable portal. The broken end had
been painted, so the cause of fracture could not be determined.
One
wire in the downstream anchorage ran between two adjacent strands. The
wire was taut. Whether that was due to an impressed load or tension
caused by the seizings could not be determined.
On November 19, 1982, two small, unstiffened single-lane suspension
bridges at Tram and Sutton in Pike County (Figure 23) were examined.
The main cables of those bridges were helical strands that were exposed
to the atmosphere.
The strands had served well over their 30-year
service lives. The wires showed some light corrosion of the zinc at the
wire interstices, but no ferrous rust was detected (Figure 24).
REVIEW OF BRIDGE WIRE CORROSION PROBLEMS
There was little impetus to investigate corrosion problems on
bridges until the Silver Bridge collapse at Point Pleasant, West
Virginia, in 1967. For that reason, there was a lapse in bridge wire
corrosion research between the mid-1940's and the early 1970's; however,
notable gains in the understanding of corrosion mechanisms occurred
during that period.
In the 1970's, the principal work on bridge-wire corrosion was
contained in the Boeing-FHWA reports on stress corrosion of highway
bridge steels.
That was followed by investigative reports on the
Portsmouth Bridge second corrosion problem in 1979 and 1980.
The lack of research on bridge-wire corrosion may be due, in part,
to a general belief that the Portsmouth Bridge corrosion problems were
isolated phenomena caused by unusual local conditions. To dispel that
view, a review of the elements of relevant literature is presented.
Hopefully, this will also provide a unified view of suspension bridgewire corrosion based upon literature that is sparse and somewhat
disjointed.
The National Bureau of Standards' investigation of heat-treated
wire, originally employed on the Ambassador and Mt. Hope bridges, bears
note because it set a precedent for much of the following failure
analyses of bridge wires. Researchers attempted to replicate the wire
fracture process in laboratory tests. The six-year lapse between the
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Figure 22.

Figure 23.

Swollen Strands in the Ohio Bridge, Secondary Anchor House
(1980).

Unstiffened Suspension Bridge in Eastern Kentucky (1982).
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Figure 24.

Exposed Cable on an Unstiffened Suspension Bridge (1982).
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initiation of tests and publication of results indicated difficulty was
encountered in that approach.
The investigators were cognizant of the multitude of problems
encountered at the wire mill, and the association of those problems with
hydrogen embrittlement. However, when Bureau of Standards' research was
conducted, the investigators may have been unaware of all aspects of the
damaging effects of retained hydrogen.
The landmark paper on hydrogen
problems by Zapffe and Sims (78) was not published until several years
after the Bureau of Standards report.
The Bureau of Standards' investigators assumed the galvanized wire
would outgas any residual hydrogen at room temperature in a short time
and concluded the heat-treated wire problems were due to other causes.
However, Townsend (79) has shown that hot-dip galvanizing traps hydrogen
and will not permit outgassing even at elevated temperatures.
The Bureau of Standards' investigators performed a series of
mechanical tests on both heat-treated and cold-drawn wire.
Most of
those tests were inconclusive. Even when the resulting static tensile
failures of the heat-treated wires resembled hydrogen-induced fractures,
the investigators failed to grasp the relationship.·
Comparative fatigue tests between galvanized heat-treated and
galvanized cold-worked wire revealed that heat-treated wire possessed a
slightly lower fatigue limit.
Galvanized wire of both types had
significantly
lower
fatigue
limits
than
uncoated
wire.
The
investigators reported that fracture surfaces of the fatigued wires
resembled field failures. Without enumerating those features or any
further significant findings, the investigators concluded the field
problems were fatigue-related.
Based on present knowledge, the heat-treated wire problems were
probably related to classical hydrogen embrittlement.
Most field
fractures occurred at low construction stresses.
The wires had been
subjected to relatively few fatigue cycles at the time of fracture.
Most field breaks occurred at locations where static stresses were high
due to residual stresses caused by bending the wires (i.e., at the
strand shoes and bands).
Laboratory fatigue tests revealed heat-treated wires were not
noticably weaker than normal cold-worked wires when the surface
roughness condition was taken into account. Since the wires tested were
unnotched, fatigue crack initiation was probably more significant than
fatigue crack propagation. The difference in fatigue limits between
galvanized and bright wires may be explained by several facts: 1) the
surface finish of galvanized wire is rougher than that of bright wire
and 2) galvanized wire will tend to form small cracks at the zinc-steel
interface.
Both factors will decrease the number of load cycles
required for crack incubation and lower the fatigue limit in an
atmosphere of low corrosivity.
Fatigue testing is an unsatisfactory method for detecting residual
hydrogen damage. Static tensile tests on field specimens indicated wide
variation of wire strengths.
Many field specimens, that failed at
stresses lower than the design yield strength, had transverse fractures
and exhibited little reduction of area at the breaks.
Fractures
encountered in the field were similar to the laboratory static tensile
tests in those respects.
The ability to produce such static tensile
failures is a good sign that hydrogen embrittlement was involved.
No
mention was found of corrosion being detected on the wires of the two
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bridges. Wires of the Ambassador and Mt. Hope bridges were not exposed
to the atmosphere for sufficient time for corrosion to have been a
factor.
Wire from the first Portsmouth Bridge corrosion problem was
originally analyzed by the Carnegie Institute of Technology.
Specimen
wires from the bridge were subjected to mechanical (tensile) tests.
Wire specimens, from locations near anchorage shoes, failed at low
stresses and elongations.
Probably,
the wires
tested possessed
undetected corrosion cracks that caused the low mechanical properties.
Wires from locations outside the anchorages that were tested met
existing materials' specifications.
No significant cracking was noted
in cables at points outside the anchorages. The Carnegie investigator
opined that only wires near the anchor shoes were "embrittled" and that
those wires had suffered from a combination of stress and corrosion, or
stress-corrosion cracking. However, the investigator had not performed
any work to verify that statement. It should be restated that knowledge
of corrosion cracking was minimal at the time of that investigation.
Several years after the Carnegie report, the National Bureau of
Standards performed
stress-corrosion tests
on bridge wire.
The
investigator, Pollard (80), stated:
"The
principal
purpose
of
the
supplementary
investigation,
therefore, was not to determine the cause of the original failures but
to attempt to produce experimentally stress-corrosion breaks in the wire
similar to those which occurred in service."

Pollard was able to produce stress-corrosion failures similar to those
from the Portsmouth Bridge. He then concluded:
"The results of the laboratory tests strongly support the tentative
conclusion cited above, that the service failures of the Portsmouth
bridge wires were due to the combined effects of stress and corrosion.
The possibility of parts of the cables having been exposed to the attack
of nitrate solutions of concentrations comparable to those used in the
laboratory tests has been pointed out and the results of these tests
show that failures can be caused by the corrosive action of such
solutions in combination with imposed stresses comparable to those that
could be produced merely by straightening the wire."
The conclusions are in contradiction to the aforestated aims of
Pollard's
research.
Based on the
facts,
then existent,
those
conclusions were speculative.
Most Portsmouth test wires were bent into a smaller curvature than
the reel set (approximately 25 inches).
Specimens that did not fail in
Pollard's tests assumed a smaller curvature than the reel set, showing
that the wires were tested at yield-magnitude stresses.
None of the
straightened wires tested by Pollard failed. It is questionable whether
the high stresses imposed during the Bureau of Standards' bend tests
reflected service stresses on the bridge.
Another question arises regarding the choice of potential corrodants
used in the tests. ·Pollard used ammonium compounds, nitrates, and
sodium hydroxide.
Of those, ammonium nitrite and sodium hydroxide are
now considered corrosion inhibitors.
Most corrodants Pollard tested
were not those that would normally be associated with a highway
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environment.
Perhaps his choice of potential corrodants reflects the
limited knowledge of stress corrosion that existed at that time.
Mention has been made in other literature that trace amounts of
nitrogen compounds were detected on the Portsmouth wires (81). To the
authors' knowledge, no investigation has been conducted concerning the
presence of "harmful corrodants in the Portsmouth area. No nitrates were
detected in the river, anchor house moisture, or on the surface of the
wires. No mention of nitrates or nitrogen was indicated in the chemical
analysis contained in Pollard's report. Also, it may be significant
that the amount of sulfur Pollard detected in the wires was in the range
of allowable sulfur content for bridge wire.
It is not known whether
the wires were cleaned prior to chemical analysis.
If trace quantities of nitrogen are detected in chemical analyses of
steel, the source of that element should be determined.
Trace
quantities of ammonium salts on corroding wire may be formed from the
nitrogen content of the steel (82).
Many recent researchers have mistakenly presumed that Pollard
conclusively proved the first Portsmouth corrosion problem to be stress
corrosion induced by nitrates. That is not true.
Most corrosion cracking on the original Portsmouth wire occurred at
tangent points to the wire curvature at the strand shoes. Due to the
location of the cracks, some engineers felt that a major factor in ,the
cracking process was high stresses (residual and stress concentrations)
at those points. Failure may have been more related to use of a waterpermeable tar coating placed over the strand loops aftet the 1937
floods, which entered the Ohio anchorages.
That coating would allow
retention of water in close contact with the wires for extended periods
of time.
Recommendations from the Battelle investigation of the second
Portsmouth Bridge problem were based on limited information at the time
of bridge closure.
Subsequent examination of the cables, during
dismantling, verified those recommendations, including necessity of
replacing the bridge cables.
The Battelle researchers performed a field inspection on the
Portsmouth Bridge that. provided a better understanding of the corrosion
processes. Also, the field inspection provided direction for laboratory
work.

Laboratory work conducted by Battelle identified one element,
sulfur, that may have been involved in the corrosion cracking process.
That indicates the presence of sulfur-bearing compounds (i.e., H s
2
and/or so 2 from the atmosphere), in aqueous solutions, inside tfie
cables.
~ulfur
compounds may form mild acids and increase the
corrosivity of aqueous solutions, increasing the corrosion rate. Sulfur
also may act as a cathodic poison and promote the entry of hydrogen into
the wires.
Objectives of the Battelle work were to identify the general cause
of the Portsmouth wire problems and recommend a course of action. The
scope of work was limited by funding and time. The investigation did
not address, in detail, the atmospheric conditions at Portsmouth and a
causative pollutant or its source. Also, the laboratory work, while
adequate to identify a general cause of wire failure (corrosion
cracking), was not sufficiently extensive to definitely determine which
specific corrosive mechanism or mechanisms were involved.
The Boeing reports are very extensive and cover the broad range of
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structural ferrous materials.
However, as with most overview-type
studies, there are possible exceptions or variances to statements or
conclusions contained in the study material.
The authors feel the
Boeing report may contain several such contentious items.
The first Boeing report suggested that stress-corrosion problems due
to water/bird-excrement reactions as being unlikely (83); however, there
is no known work on that specific issue to completely verify that
statement.
Also, it should be noted the stay-cable fractures on the
·Brooklyn Bridge, detected in June 1981, were suspected to involve bird
droppings. The buildup of bird droppings on the secondary cables of the
Ohio Bridge was considerable.
(Those areas have since been cleaned.)
The presence of at least one broken wire in that area suggested caution
should be exercised prior to accepting the Boeing conclusion in the
absence of definitive tests.
Findings of the third Boeing report are seemingly in contradiction
with events at Portsmouth, especially in consideration of findings of
the Battelle report.
The Boeing investigators were unable to create
stress-corrosion cracks in notched wire specimens subjected to stresses
exceeding the maximum wire design stress at the Portsmouth Bridge. To
compound the contradiction, some Boeing tests used so - and H2 S2
sa tura ted aqueous solutions.
Those are typical of the sulfur-bearing
compounds predicted by the Battelle investigators to have caused the
Portsmouth bridge corrosion problems.
Both Pollard and Townsend were able to produce stress corrosion
failures in wire under more severe conditions than those employed by
Boeing.
In the Boeing tests, wire specimens were subjected to
continuous immersion at constant ambient temperatures.
The Portsmouth
Bridge cables were subject to periodic wetting and drying, heating and
cooling, and freezing and thawing.
Some of those factors may have
interacted to increase the severity of the corrodant_action and decrease
fracture resistance of the wires. The method of load application (i.e.,
static tensile loading) and stress levels used by Boeing might require a
long incubation period to initiate stress-corrosion cracking.
Despite use of acetic acid to prevent corrosion buildup, a layer of
Fe S may have formed on the steel surface, inhibiting enH:ainment of
hyifrogen into the notch.
Also, cathodic currents may have existed on
the Portsmouth wires. Such currents might act to charge hydrogen into
the wires at defective areas. The Boeing specimens were not polarized,
anodically or cathodically.
Another con tri bu tory factor may be the chemical composition of the
wires.
As shown in Table 2, subtle changes in specifications have led
to present-day bridge wire that is lower in carbon, phosphorous, and
sulfur than earlier wires.
The newer wire may be more res is tan t to
corrosion cracking than the Portsmouth Bridge wire.
The Fairbank Highway Research Station (FHRS) report contained
several interesting observations, including the possibility of hydrogen
damage, low fracture toughness of wires, and a relationship be tween
surface pitting and final fracture. The report concluded, on the basis
of optical
inspection,
the
fractures
resembled
stress-corrosion
failures.
However, as with the Battelle report, no de tailed analysis
was made to prove that fact.
The FHRS investigators alluded that the
wire was
susceptible
to
stress-corrosion
cracking and hydrogen
embrittlement due to its mechanical properties. The investigators also
suggested that the hydrogen content in the wire steel was due to the
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galvanizing process.
Townsend and others have shown that a hot-dip galvanized steel is
more prone to hydrogen embrittlement and stress corrosion than the same
steel in its uncoated state (84). He attributed that behavior to the
barrier effect of the intermetallic coating existing at the interface
between zinc and steel.
Such research has shown that cathodicprotective coatings decrease resistance to' hydrogen-related fracture
mechanisms. That would seemingly support the FHRS report; however, the
report contained several inferences that bear comment.
The first of those inferences concerned the general acceptability of
the Portsmouth Bridge second cable wires. It should be noted that by
the time the Portsmouth Bridge cables were first replaced, in 1940, over
half of the modern American suspension bridges had been constructed.
Wire making had reached a high degree of sophistication.
The 1930
specifications for the Maysville Bridge wire were furnished by Modjeski
and Masters. Mechanical properties in those specifications are shown in
Table 3. Since Modjeski and Masters also were the consultant on the
Portsmouth Bridge first cable replacement operation, specifications for
the second Portsmouth cables would not be expected to be less strict.
The Maysville Bridge specifications required that ten coils of wire from
each heat be mechanically tested.
The FHRS report did not state the number of wires mechanically
tested nor the original surface condition of those wires. However, the
wires tested possessed sufficient tensile strength (236 ksi).
FHRS
values for elongation and reduction in area, measures of material
ductility, were slightly below the specified Maysville Bridge values.
However, the FHRS tensile tests employed an extremely small gage length
(1.5 inches) compared to 10 inches as specified by Modjeski and Masters.
That should readily account for the slight difference between the FHRS
elongation (3 percent) and the Modjeski and Masters specified elongation
(5 percent).
The difference between the FHRS reduction in area (28
percent) and the Modjeski and Masters specified value (30 percent),
though small, bears comment.
During the manufacture of the Portsmouth Bridge second cable wires,
a problem was encountered in getting the first lot of galvanized wire to
meet the reduction in area specifications (85). Smaller wires, on the
average, were closer to specification requirements than were larger
wires.
Experiments showed the lead-bath and zinc-tank temperatures
could be adjusted to meet the du,ctility criteria, but only at the
expense of wire strength. Rather than accept that, the parties involved
chose to accept a lower reduction in area. Specifications were changed
to allow a reduction in area of 25 percent, with the added stipulation
that every coil was to be inspected.
Tests indicated about five percent of the 0.198-inch diameter wire
was rejected because of low ductility.
About nine percent of the
0.205-inch diameter wire was rejected due to cuppiness (segregation).
That information indicated the wire, even though not within
specification requirements, was not seriously deficient. The 30 percent
reduction in area is, at best, a subjective criterion. The increased
frequency of testing probably provided sufficient assurance of the
suitability of the wire.
That explains, in part, the mechanical
properties of the wire determined by FHRS.
The FHRS chemical analysis of the wire reveals the Portsmouth wire
was well within the limits of Modjeski and Masters specifications. The
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TABLE 3.

V>
f-'

MECHANICAL AND PHYSICAL TEST PROPERTIES AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR BRIDGE WIRES

MAYSVILLE BRIDGE!

PORTSMOUTH
BRIDGE
(ORIGINAL) 2a

PORTSMOUTH
BRIDGE
(REPLACEMENT)

MODERN WIRE3

Ultimate Tensile
Strength (ksi)

220 Min

242-265

220 Min

217a

Yield Point (ksi)

170 Min

167-185

170 Min

16la

Elongation (%)

5 (10-in. ga) Min

0.5-1.7

5 ( 10-in. ga)

10 (2-in. ga)a

Reduction in
Area (%}

30 Min

19.3-47.0

30 Min

N/A

Mandrel Bend Size

1-1/2 Diameters •

N/A

N/A

1-1/2 Diameters

Standard Preece
Tests

4 One-Minute Immersions

N/A

N/A

5 One-Minuteb
Immersions

1.
2.
3.

I

Specifications for Maysville Bridge (Ref 88, p 90)
(a) Laboratory data (Ref 67, p 483); (b) Specifications for Portsmouth Bridge (Ref 68, p 12)
(a) Laboratory data (Ref 72, p 49); (b) U.S. Steel Corporation, The Making, Shaping and Treating
of Steel, Herbick and Held, Pittsburgh, PA, 1971, p 871.
N/ A ::-Not Available

b

carbon content, as measured by FHRS, was 0.83 percent compared to 0.85
percent maximum specified by Modjeski and Masters. The FHRS sulfur and
phosphorous analyses were very low, 0.022 and 0.012 percent,
respectively. That was below specified maximums of 0.04 percent for
both elements. Those two elements are -especially important as they can
act as cathodic poisons in stress-corrosion problems.
The second issue to be addressed is the hydrogen content of the
wires. The FHRS-reported hydrogen content of 0.6-0.7 ppm in the wire is
not considered a sign of defective (brittle) wire in either construction
or industry practices. Townsend (86) mentioned that commercial steels
generally contain 0.5 to 5.0 ppm of hydrogen without exhibiting hydrogen
embrittlement. The damaging effect of hydrogen is not only related to
its quantity but also to the steel microstructure and the disposition of
the hydrogen in the material. Wires mechanically tested by FHRS did not
show sufficient differences in ductility from normal specifications to
indicate the Portsmouth wires were embrittled by hydrogen. Tests on
ungalvanized outgassed wire should have provided some insight into the
influence of'hydrogen on those wires; however, present evidence does not
strongly support any contention of embrittlement due to the presence of
excessive manufacture-entrained hydrogen.
Use of hydrogen inhibitors, related to pickling of steel, dates back
to at least the 1930's (87).
Perhaps, due to problems with the
Ambassador and Mt. Hope bridges, engineers of that period became aware
of hydrogen-related problems that might arise in metal-cleaning
operations prior to the galvanizing process.
Those concerns were
reflected in subsequent wire specifications (88) such as ones for the
Maysville Bridge, which stipulated:
"29S(c) After patenting, the rods shall be cleaned of all scale by
immersion in diluted hydrochloric acid.
Sulphuric acid shall not be
used. Any coil or bundle in which defects are revealed by the pickling
shall be discarded. All acid shall be removed from the rods by thorough
and vigorous rinsing with fresh water and the coils shall be dipped into
lime-water to neutralize any remaining traces of acid. The rods shall
be baked for several hours to remove atomic hydrogen dissolved in the
metal during pickling.
297(b) Hydrochloric acid shall be used for the pickling solution
>preceding the galvanizing.
No sulphuric acid shall be used in any
pickling process in the production of the wire.
The pickling cycle
shall include the proper use of inhibitors and approved means for
eliminating retained acid and atomic hydrogen before galvanizing ......
Another possible inference from the FHRS report was that galvanized
steel wire was prone to hydrogen-embrittlement.
The aspects of
retained-hydrogen problems in galvanized steel and possible avoidance
measures were well covered by Townsend (89). Hydrogen retained from the
hot-dip galvanizing process will not significantly contribute to
cracking processes unless zinc corrosion charges hydrogen into the crack
tip. No proof exists to support the idea that retained hydrogen is a
major problem in wires, including the ones used on the Portsmouth
Bridge.
Horvick (90) notes there have been very few instances of
hydrogen problems related to hot-dip galvanizing.
Problems associated
with electroplating-related hydrogen have also been well researched
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(91).
On both suspension bridges (Ambassador and Mt. Hope) having heattreated steel, wire fractures were detected shortly after erection.
Those broken wires did not show signs of corrosion. If the Portsmouth
Bridge second
cable wires
suffered from embrittlement due
to
manufacture-induced hydrogen, they would have failed early and would
have been detected during installation.
Such failures would likely
occur at the plant, during the stranding operation, or in the field
prior to cable wrapping.
To the author$' knowledge, broken wires encountered during the
Portsmouth Bridge second corrosion problem were detected only at
locations that had experienced corrosion of the zinc coating and, at
least, limited corrosion of the underlying steel.
If the wires had
suffered fractures due to the galvanizing process, broken wires would
have been detected in locations where no corrosion was evident.
That
would be especially true just prior to the recabling operation, after
the cables had experienced their greatest deterioration and highest dead
loading. None of the wires contained surface defects, such as checking
or tearing, associated with retained hydrogen. Also, none of the wirefracture surfaces examined exhibited signs of flaking.
The amount of hydrogen detected on surfaces of the as-received FHRS
wire was not high for a corrosion product. That hydrogen was probably
the result of cathodic reduction of hydrogen ions during the corrosion
process. The presence of sulfur as a cathodic poison also may have
promoted the entry of hydrogen atoms into the wire surface, in the event
zinc coating was completely depleted in a given area. However, that
type reaction may be more likely in a pit or crack.
Unfortunately, the FHRS report did not reference field locations of
the wire specimens.
As previously mentioned, corrosion activity
differed between various portions of cable. The quantity of hydrogen in
wires from different locations on the bridge would probably vary if
corrosion were the source.
Burke's (92) report contained several valuable insights relative to
the corrosion condition of the Portsmouth Bridge prior to the second
recabling operation. His work noted difficulties in resolving results
of previous reports relating events at Portsmouth.
The Burke report
contained several items that warrant discussion.
One concern is the fact the Ohio Department of Transportation report
tacitly assumed the Portsmouth Bridge second corrosion problem was
caused by stress corrosion. That could lead to the conclusion that an
unusual corrosion condition existed in the Portsmouth area, which could
presumably be either a specific corrodant or a severe corrosion
condition due to typical atmospheric pollutants.
The first issue may be dealt with by the fact (noted by Burke) that
the only stress corrosion-related element detected on the cables was
sulfur.
The relative abundance of that element in industrial
atmospheres precludes the assumption of an unusual specific corrodant.
Also, unusual historical sources of sulfuric acids in the immediate area
of the bridge were not located.
The second issue is more difficult to dismiss.
Admittedly, the
Portsmouth area was, at one time, a heavily industrialized area (though
much of that industry was downwind from the bridge).
From about 20
years prior to the most recent closure of the bridge, the economy of
area had changed.
As a result, the atmosphere in and around the
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Portsmouth Bridge was well within federal pollution standards and was
similar to conditions in the Maysville area by the early 1970's.
Burke observed rapid uniform corrosion of recently sandblasted wire
on the bridge when subjected to rain. However, contrary to statements
about acid rain, that is not a sign of severe atmospheric corrosivity.
Freshly blast-cleaned steel will rust quickly and copiously when exposed
to moisture, regardless of whether the moisture is or is not corrodantladen.
There were many more important factors contributing to the
Portsmouth Bridge problem.
Some are contained in the Burke report.
Several facts tend to downplay the effect of atmospheric severity in any
corrosion-cracking process that may have occurred at Portsmouth. First,
research has shown that for stress-corrosion problems, the pH of a
corrodant in a crack or pit may be very low, even when the pH in the
bulk of the corrodant in contact with metal is nearly neutral. Also,
very little sulfur is required to act as a cathodic poison in hydrogenrelated stress-corrosion cracking. In fact, too much sulfur may prove
detrimental to the process under some conditions.
Within ordinary
limits, the effect of concentration of atmospheric pollutants may not
have an accelerating effect on the actual cracking process. However, it
may affect durability of the galvanized coating that protects the wire
from the onset of corrosion-cracking processes.
The report referenced one observer's comment that the number of
breaks was roughly proportional to the amount of observable surface
corrosion. That is only true in areas where flowing water (washing) did
not occur and (or) stagnant water remained in contact with the wires
over a long period. On steeply inclined portions of the main span and
the Ohio side span, cables suffered mucb more severe uniform corrosion
than the nearly horizontal portions. However, in the nearly horizontal
portions of the cables, where water could stand, the number of wire
breaks was much greater and the observer's comments were correct. A
more revealing statement would be that breaks occurred only in areas
experiencing at least some uniform ferrous corrosion on the wire.
The National Physical Laboratory stated that hydrogen-embrittlement
problems arise-from the uniform corrosion of wire. The NPL authorities
also felt that grouting around wires would preclude the problem. In
view of the problems with Roebling's grout-filled anchorages, some doubt
should be cast as to suitability of grouting for use as a wireprotection procedure.
POTENTIAL CORROSION PROBLEMS
Oftentimes, failure analyses, especially those involving corrosion
cracking, suffer from variances in terminology or sometimes lack of
complete agreement by researchers about basic fundamentals.
For
instance, some researchers term loss of ductility due to the presence of
molecular hydrogen (not connected with corrosion problems) as '"hydrogen
embrittlement". Others have broadly ascribed that term to both cracking
and loss of ductility, regardless of whether atomic or molecular
hydrogen was involved 'or whether or not an electrochemical reaction was
involved.
Some researchers have called corrosion-cracking problems
involving hydrogen "stress-corrosion cracking" (SCC); others use more
restrictive terms such as "hydrogen-assisted cracking" or "hydrogen
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stress cracking". Also, apparently there has not always been complete
agreement about the exact role of hydrogen in corrosion cracking; nor,
has there always been complete agreement about the salient features of
the various forms of corrosion cracking, many of which may involve
hydrogen to some extent.
To investigators of corrosion cracking who are not directly involved
in basic corrosion research, those difficulties should temper any
pronouncements concerning mechanisms of failure.
In coping with
corrosion cracking, contributory rather than mechanistic factors may
eventually prove of more value.
In the case of the Portsmouth Bridge, the following facts relate to
the possible mechanisms of failure:
l. Considerable general corrosion occurred on the main cables.
2. At least some uniform ferrous corrosion of the wire was detected
at each fracture site.
(This was first observed by the Battelle
investigators.)
3. The frequency of wire fractures was not necessarily proportional
to the severity of uniform corrosion.
4. Some wire fractures were clustered about cable bands.
5. No fractures were detected between splay saddles and strand end
fittings, areas where strands were exposed to the environment.
6.
No atmospheric SCC-specific corrodants were identified in
unusual concentrations at Portsmouth.
7. The only possible damaging elements identified on the Portsmouth
wire in laboratory investigations were sulphur and hydrogen (by the
Fairbank Highway Research Station and Battelle).
8. Portsmouth wire specimens exhibited several types of fracture
morphologies.
9.
The bridge cables are subject to both corrosion and cyclic
loading (low frequency and low stress), a combination about which little
known research exists.

As previously noted, all Portsmouth wire failures contained some
superficial zinc and ferrous corrosion.
Also, no fracture surfaces
inspected showed evidence of flaking. That fact tended to rule out
classic molecular (H ) hydrogen embrittlement. Also, the frequency and
2 loading probably precluded cracking due to pure
stress range of cyci1c
fatigue.
A more likely cause was stress-corrosion cracking. Considering the
subject metal (steel), the only laboratory-identified corroding elements
(hydrogen and sulfur) and the general corrosion evident on the cables,
the anodic-dissolution sec mechanism is improbable.
If sec was the
prime cause of failure, the stress-sorption sec mechanism would be the
most likely cause of failure.
That type of corrosive attack could be
termed "hydrogen-assisted cracking", "hydrogen-stress cracking", or
"corrosion-generated hydrogen embrittlement".
Townsend (93) produced hydrogen-assisted stress-corrosion cracking
in aqueous solutions saturated with hydrogen sulfide (H S) using bare
2
cold-drawn wire similar to bridge wire. He noted that cracks formed by
the sec mechanism tended to be aligned 45 degrees to the direction of
tensile stress. That type failure was produced in both uniaxial tension
and bending.
Usually, stress-corrosion cracks occur normal to the principal
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tensile stress. Townsend felt the unusual fracture alignment in colddrawn wire was due to the wire-forming process.
Cold-drawn wire is
known to have a (110> texture.
The (110> direction of the B.C.C. iron
lattice has a greater than random possibility of being aligned parallel
to the wire axis.
As a result, the lflOO [ cleavage planes for B.C. C.
iron have a greater than random probability of being situated at 45
degrees to the wire axis, which was also the direction of tensile
stress. Therefore, brittle fractures would be expected to be oriented
normal to the cleavage planes or at approximately 45 degrees to the wire
axis.
To prove that, Townsend heat treated cold-drawn wire specimens to
remove the effect of texture.
After the heat-treated wires were
subjected to stress-corrosion cracking, he noted the sec fractures were
oriented normal to the wire axis.
Interestingly, that phenomenon was also observed some 30 years
earlier in Pollard's report.
SCC fractures, produced in specimens of
cold-drawn Portsmouth Bridge wire's, failed obliquely to the wire
longitudinal axis.
Similar fractures created in specimens of heattreated Mt. Hope Bridge wire were normal to the axis.
Also, Thul
exhibited a cold-drawn galvanized bridge wire (used on a cable-stayed
bridge) that also had a stress-corrosion crack oblique to the wire axis

(94).
Two facts tend to mitigate the role of stress corrosion cracking in
the Portsmouth Bridge second corrosion problem. Those are: results of
stress-corrosion tests of bridge wire performed by Boeing and the
differing fracture morphologies observed on the Portsmouth Bridge wires.
The Boeing experiments, using circumferentially notched galvanized
bridge-wire specimens showed stress corrosion could not be induced in
wires at high stresses (120 ksi) in 5 ppm H s aqueous solutions (a much
2
higher
concentration
than
normal
atmospheres).
The
corrodant
concentration used by Townsend (95) was considerably higher than that
used by Boeing. In a corrosion reaction involving iron and H S, one
2
principal reaction is

When the zinc begins to corrode, it acts as an anode and donates
electrons to the exposed steel at the notch (Figure 25). The surface of
the exposed steel becomes cathodic and attracts atomic hydrogen to low
energy locations in the iron lattice (with sulfur promoting this
action).
However, when the rate of hydrogen charging or the applied
stresses are too low, the corrosion product Fe S may be deposited in
sufficient thicknesses on the notch to act as a dlffusion barrier. That
will prevent further charging of hydrogen into the exposed steel.
In
effect, the reaction is auto-extinguishing.
The Boeing investigators
used acetic acid to suppress formation of a Fe S diffusion barrier;
however, that may not have been effective.
x
There are several explanations of why the Boeing sec tests may not
be applicable to stress-corrosion cracking on the Portsmouth Bridge.
During the service life of the bridge, zinc and ferrous corrosion
products could trap and store corrodants' increasing their effective
concentration at the metal-corrosion product interface.
Also, the
massive amount of general corrosion and presence of other forms of
corrosive attack on the bridge indicated that corrosion polarization may
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A.

Corrosion of wire initiates at 1 with the reaction x Fe+ H2S ..... FexS +Hz.

B.

Zn coating acts as an anode at 2 and furnishes
e" to exposed Fe. This, in tom, cathodically
charges the exposed Fe with H+ that diffuses
to low-energy locations in the Fe lattice at 3 .

C.

However, Fex-S forms a barrier to H+ trying to
penetrate into the notch, and the embrittling
reaction stalls.
p
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have occurred. , That would create high induced currents that could
charge hydrogen into the wires and possibly suppress formation of the
Fe S corrosion product.
x Unfortunately, even those possibilities do not explain variances in
fracture morphologies observed on the Portsmouth wire.
None of the
bridge wire fractures showed any signs of ductility (necking). Fracture
types were 1) flat (transverse to the wire axis), 2) flat-and-invert
(part of fracture transverse, the remainder oriented at an angle to th~
wire axis), or 3) spiralling (angled approximately 45 degrees to the
wire axis. Most wire fractures observed at Portsmouth were of the flatand-invert type.
Those wires showed differing amounts of flat-andinvert fracture surfaces.
The best explanation of the first two fracture types appears to be
corrosion fatigue. That phenomenon might also explain why the Boeing
experiments failed to produce stress-corrosion cracking; yet under less
severe conditions, corrosion cracking occurred at Portsmouth. As with
plain fatigue, corrosion-fatigue cracks tend to be normal to the applied
stress; or in this case, a transverse fracture perpendicular to the
longitudinal axis of the wire.
Nield (96) observed such typical corrosion-fatigue cracks in a
service failure of bridge prestressing wire. That wire had been exposed'
to water and the cracks had initiated in preferentially corroded zones
close to the fractures. Multiple cracks were evident,, most of which
were mainly transverse.
Williams and Firth (97) described fatigue cracks on hoisting rope
wires as transverse fractures exhibiting a sharp tip at the point of
final fracture. However, those fractures had occurred at low nominal
service loads. The authors were of the opinion those ropes had either
been in extended service or had been abusively overloaded.
The
possibility of corrosion fatigue was not considered in the article.
Whitaker and Booker (98) produced corrosion fatigue cracks in mild,
drawn sheet steel in distilled water.
Those tests involved lowfrequency loading and reverse bending.
That work indicated aqueous
contact may be an important factor where corrosion fatigue is involved,
and also, participation or concentration of an attendant corrodant may
not be as important as with stress-corrosion cracking.
The stress range of most suspension bridge cable cyclic loading is
low. For the Maysville, Bridge, the cable design live load was about 21
ksi, and it is doubtful the bridge is ever loaded that heavily. Larger
'suspension bridges may experience lower live loads than smaller bridges,
especially in respect to their dead loads. Resultant stresses in the
cables may be simple tension or combined tension and bending at the
bands, depending upon rigidity of the stiffening truss (when one is
present) and the cross section and curvature of the cables.
Suspension-bridge main cables are infrequently subjected to heavy
live loads.
Both the Maysville and Portsmouth bridges have heavy
traffic intersections at the ends of the approaches.
During peak
traffic periods, the bridges are completely loaded, though usually with
a mixture of cars and trucks. It is likely that most suspension bridges
experience from three to less than one hundred major live-load
applications per day.
Effects of wind loadings have been omitted in this report; however,
that was covered at length in the Federal Highway Administration Report
No. FHWA/RD-81/090, "Analytical Study for Fatigue of Highway Bridge
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Cables."
Relatively small cyclic stress ranges and infrequency of significant
load applications on main cables probably precluded normal fatigue
problems.
However, as Nield noted, the stress range required for
corrosion fatigue to cause failure diminishes with time. Presence of a
corrodant, even in low concentrations, may be sufficient, combined with
low-range cyclic loads, to cause corrosion fatigue. While cylic loading
of the Portsmouth Bridge was infrequent, peak loads were maintained for
long periods (up to several hours).
Also, many other corrosion
mechanisms operant on the Portsmouth Bridge created a rough corrosionproduct laden surface, which could facilitate corrosion-fatigue crack
initiation, on the wires.
The type of corrosion-fatigue mechanism hypothesized for the
Portsmouth Bridge wires initiates with formation of a crack on the wire
surface (Figure 26). Cracks form on exterior surfaces of the wire on
the outer layer of the strand. The crack initiation site may be a pit
or possibly a localized rupture of the protective surface film caused by
other corrosion processes. It should be noted that fatigue corrosion of
steels in acids is not always related to pits. Crack arrests due to
insufficient driving stresses and due to a corrosion-product barrier at
the crack tip prevent extended corrosive attack at that location.
Points along crack walls, which are exposed to the aqueous corrodant,
may experience secondary dissolution along the elongated grain
boundaries.
Application of another major cyclic load ruptures the brittle
corrosion product (FexS) or separates the corrosion product-metal
interface. That allows the aqueous corrodant solution to contact the
iron and initiate new corrosive attack. Due to the presence of sulfur
(the cathodic poison) and cathodic currents caused by corroding zinc,
hydrogen is charged into the iron and the crack extends into the wire.
However, the depth of hydrogen damage may be limited; and the crack may
rearrest due to the formation of another corrosion-product crack barrier
at the extended crack tip.
The steps repeat upon further applications of other major cyclic
loads. When the· crack reaches a critical size, the stress intensity at
the crack tip, K~X' becomes greater than K CC' the SCC critical stress
1
intensity. CracK mechanism changes to the s~ress-corrosion cracking and
the crack changes from a transverse to an oblique orientation. That
process would be considerably shorter in duration than the preceeding
corrosion-fatigue cracking.
The Portsmouth Bridge wire failures that exhibited flat-and-invert
failures contained varying amounts of such fracture areas.
That is
probably related to variations of applied stresses acting on the wires.
When dead-load stresses are low (i.e., few wires in the strand are
broken or little cross section of the wire has been consumed by general
corrosion), the corrosion-fatigue mechanism will control and most
fractures will be flat and transverse to wire axis. When dead-load
stresses are high (i.e., many wires in the strand are broken or a large
loss of cross section has occurred), stress corrosion will control; and
most fractures will be inverted (or spiralling).
The family of fractures evident on the Portsmouth Bridge wires
represented a progression of failure of the strands and, eventually, the
cables (Figure 27). Early failures were probably of the flat type and
occurred at low dead-load stresses (where corrosion fatigue was the sole
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Crack initiation and arrest at a point of H+
damage.
Crack tendrils form as Fe,tJ barrier forms.
Cylic load breaks barrier, corrodant contacts Fe.
Corrosion action charge Fe with H+ at crack tip.
Wh~n sufficient H+ is charged, KIX > KISCC
and crack grows.
Crack stalls beyond area of H+ damage and
FexS barrier forms.
Cylic load again breaks barrier.
Repeated H+ charging into Fe.
Repeated crack growth in H+ damaged area.
When the crack has grown to a sufficient size,
KJX>> K1scc· The fracture mechanism changes.
Crack reorients along texture plane.
Crack has opened sufficiently that no cyclic
effects are required for wire fracture.
The wire fractures with the resulting flat and
invert fracture surface.

Proposed Corrosion-Fatigue Mechanism for Wire Cracking.
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fracture process).
As corrosion damage and dead-load stresses
increased, fracture morphology changed from flat to flat-and-invert with
increasing amounts of invert fracture surfaces.
The most advanced
failures were the spiralling-type at high stresses and are entirely sec
failures.
Corrosion-fatigue cracking and SCC may coexist as competing
mechanisms in the same fracture. For example, a crack may initiate by
SCC and propagate by corrosion-fatigue cracking. Conversely, corrosion
fatigue may initiate a crack that will grow by sec.
Also, both
processes may alternate during the crack-growth process. That would
make failure analysis very difficult. Corrosion fatigue does not have
to be an exclusive cracking mechanism.
Evidence to support the role of corrosion fatigue in the Portsmouth
Bridge second corrosion problem is, at best, circumstantial. Research
should be conducted to verify the effect of corrosion fatigue on bridge
wire.
It also should be noted that strands failed from the outside to
inside as did the wires. Residual stresses from the stranding operation
caused broken wires to fray outward.
The invert portions of wire
fractures lay on the inner portions of wires.
Therefore, mechanical
notches caused by fretting did not contribute to fracture processes, as
in plain fatigue. However, fretting probably contributed to the problem
by facilitating other forms of corrosion.
Galambos (99) noted that German bridge engineers considered hydrogen
embrittlement, not stresG corrosion, the source of wire problems, which
were associated with rough handling of wires and common corrosionprotection practices (probably meaning galvanized wires).
Thul's 1972 article on cable-stayed bridges in Der Stahlbau
referenced several wire corrosion problems experienced on unnamed German
bridges (100). He noted that bare wire succumbed to loss of section due
to gross corrosion, while galvanized wires suffered cracks. Thul stated
that cracks in galvanized wires occurred at tower mounting points.
Also, he found that helical-type strand was not any more corrosion-prone
than parallel-wire strand.
Thul's report contained pictures of
galvanized wires that had been subject to corrosion cracking.
The
failure(s) appeared to be of stress-corrosion cracking or hydrogenassisted cracking type {spiralling).
One of the photographs exhibited a series of rough parallel marks on
the surface of the uncorroded galvanized section. Thul termed that a
"crocodile" appearance (''Krokodilhautartige '').
Actually, the wire
appeared to be subjected to checking that could be caused by hydrogen
embrittlement {due possibly to defective wire or improper galvanizing or
by the intermetallic layer cracking under the zinc coating). Townsend
noted that hot-dip galvanizing of steel yields lower KISCC values than
plain steel or steel galvanized electrically. Corrosion of galvanized
wire investigated by Thul may have involved wire of lower quality than
employed in America. Examinations of a large amount of galvanized wire
in Kentucky have never shown "crocodile" type defects.
CLOSURE
Hypotheses and conclusions presented in this report concerning
corrosion mechanisms are, at best, tentative and require further
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laboratory testing for confirmation.
One corrosion-cracking mechanism
should not be expounded as the sole contributor to past suspension
bridge cable-wire fractures. Corrosion fatigue, however, possesses many
relevant traits detected on the Portsmouth Bridge second cable wires and
referenced in pertinent literature. Also, several forms of corrosion
cracking may have interacted during the course of wire cracking, making
it impossible to duplicate in laboratory failures using a single
corrosion-cracking mechanism.
The contribution of other forms of
corrosion to the fracture process should not be disregarded. If those
of m~chanisms had not been active, the wires would not have failed.
At the present, it would be sufficient to state that long-term
moisture contact with suspension bridge wire should be avoided. Failure
of the Portsmouth Bridge second cables was not caused by unusual
atmospheric problems in the area (though sulfur was probably present in
typical industrial concentrations). Contributory factors were probably
the design, construction, and maintainability of the wire corrosionprotection system, which allowed significant atmospheric moisture to be
in long-term contact with the wires.
Atmospheric environments at Covington and Maysville can be as
conducive to suspension bridge wire corrosion as the environment at
Portsmouth.
Events leading to closure of the Portsmouth Bridge
indicated that, once a given level of wire degradation is reached,
fractures can be expected in a surprisingly short time. Requirements
for wire corrosion cracking appear to be l) Stage 3 wire condition, 2)
long-term contact of atmospheric moisture with the wire, and 3) normally
anticipated bridge loadings (including occasional overloads). As the
bulk of wire on both of the Kentucky-owned bridges (Maysville Bridge and
Ohio River Bridge) is probably in better condition 'than Stage 3
deterioration, the main concern with those bridges is the performance of
the cable corrosion-protection systems.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations pertain to the
owned suspension bridges.

two major Kentucky-

1. Inspection ports should be installed on the Ohio Bridge (KY 17)
at Covington.
2.
Monitoring of the Maysville Bridge (US 68)
should continue.

inspection ports

3. Further research related specifically to bridge wires should be
encouraged. That work should be in the areas of corrosion failure,
wire-fracture susceptibility in various atmospheric environments, repair
of corroded cables, prevention of corrosive attack on existing bridges,
and the formulation of improved corrosion-prevention systems.
4.
Inspection of the two Kentucky-owned suspension bridges,
followed by the formulation of designs for modifications to those
bridges to preclude or arrest early corrosion problems, should be
considered.
Those modifications should be implemented as soon as
rehabilitation funding becomes available.
Also, a maintenance manual
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for each of these bridges should be prepared.
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